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A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY STUDENTS’ 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
Elizabeth A. Shaver* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last decade, the federal appellate courts have grappled with 
the issue whether, and to what extent, school officials constitutionally may 
discipline students for their off-campus speech. Before 2015, three federal 
circuit courts had extended school authority to off-campus electronic 
speech by applying a vague test that allows school officials to reach far 
beyond the iconic “schoolhouse gate” referenced in the Supreme Court’s 
1969 landmark decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District.1 Two other federal circuits had avoided the issue 
altogether by deciding the cases before them on other grounds.   
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the sixth circuit 
court to wrestle with the issue. In August 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued an 
en banc ruling in which multiple judges urged the Supreme Court to 
provide guidance regarding the scope of school discipline over students’ 
off-campus speech. 2 When a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed in 
the Fifth Circuit case, 3 it seemed possible that the Supreme Court indeed 
would provide the guidance desperately needed by the lower courts. 
However, on February 29, 2016, just days after the unexpected death of 
Justice Antonin Scalia,4 the Supreme Court denied the petition that had 
been filed in the Fifth Circuit case.5 The eight-member Court thus missed 
an opportunity to address this important First Amendment issue.  
This article reviews the varied approaches the federal circuits have 
taken regarding the scope of school officials’ authority to discipline 
students for electronic speech that is created and distributed outside of 
school. The article then proposes an analytical framework that, building 
on Supreme Court precedent, protects students’ free speech rights while 
preserving the ability of school officials to insure the safety and wellbeing 
of the school community.  
                                           
* Associate Professor of Legal Writing, The University of Akron School of Law. As 
always, many thanks to Phil Carino for his assistance.  
1 393 U.S.  503 (1969).  
2 Bell v.  Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,  779 F.3d 379, 433 (5th Cir.  2015) (Prado, J. ,  
dissenting) (“I hope that the Supreme Court soon will give courts the necessary guidance 
to resolve these difficult cases”); 779 F.3d at 403 (Costa,  J. ,  Owen, J.  and Higginson, J. ,  
concurring) (“[T]his court or the higher one will need to provide clear guidance for 
students,  teachers and school administrators”).  
3 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,  Bell v.  Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,  No. 15-666,  
2015 WL 7299351 (U.S.) (filed Nov.  17, 2015).  
4 Justice Scalia died unexpectedly on February 13, 2016.  See Adam Liptak, “Antonin 
Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court,  Dies at 79,” N.Y. Times (Feb. 13, 2016) 
(available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r= 0) 
(last visited Sept.  24, 2016).  
5 Bell v.  Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,  136 S.Ct. 1166 (2016).  
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Part I of this article examines the Supreme Court’s student speech 
precedents, none of which involved student off-campus electronic speech. 
Part II of the article then reviews the decisions in which the circuit courts 
have sought to apply the Supreme Court’s precedents to determine the 
scope of school authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech. Part 
III examines the views of legal scholars on these issues and proposes a 
framework designed to both protect students’ First Amendment rights and 
preserve the ability of school officials to ensure the safety and wellbeing 
of all individuals in the school community. 
 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S STUDENT SPEECH CASES.  
 
A.  The Supreme Court First Addresses the Scope of Students’ First 
Amendment Speech Rights While at School.  
 
The Supreme Court has decided four student speech cases. 6 
Although none of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases involved 
electronic off-campus speech, the decisions nonetheless provide an 
analytical framework that can be applied to student speech in the digital 
age.7 
Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue 
of students’ First Amendment rights while at school. In Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 8several students sued 
their local school district after they were suspended from school for 
wearing black armbands as a protest against the Vietnam War. 9 The Court 
found that the disciplinary measures had violated the students’ First 
Amendment rights.10  
In so holding, the Court affirmed that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”11 Yet the Court also recognized that First Amendment rights were 
to be applied “in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.”12 In the Court’s view, the school setting involves 
countervailing considerations that must be balanced. On the one hand, as 
                                           
6 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist. ,  393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. 
Dist.  No. 403 v. Fraser,  478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.  v.  Kuhlmeier,  484 
U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v.  Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
7 See Part III,  infra.  
8 393 U.S.  503.  
9 Id.  at 504. The plan to wear black armbands as a protest of the Vietnam War arose 
out of a meeting of adults and students held at the home of one of the plaintiffs in the 
case. This plan was communicated to the principals of the Des Moines school,  who 
adopted a policy prohibiting the wearing of black armbands at school and authorizing the 
suspension of any student who refused to remove a black armband. Id.  The plaintiffs in 
the case were aware of the newly-instituted policy before the day that they wore black 
armbands to school.  Id.  In accordance with the school policy, they were suspended until 
they returned to school without black armbands. Id.  
10 Id. at 514. The Court found that the act of wearing black armbands constituted 
symbolic speech that was entitled to First Amendment protection. Id.  at 505-06.  
11 Id.  at 506.  
12 Id.  
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institutions that “educat[e] the young for citizenship,”13 schools should not 
act in a manner that would “strangle the free mind”14 or otherwise “teach 
youth to discount important principles of our government”15 such as the 
right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Court recognized 
the “comprehensive authority”16 of school officials to maintain order at 
school. School officials must have the ability to “prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.”17  
To balance these competing concerns, the Court held that school 
officials constitutionally may discipline students for speech that 
“materially and substantially disrupt[s] the work and discipline”18 of 
school. The Court also explained that school officials need not wait for an 
actual disruption to occur at school, so long as school officials reasonably 
could forecast a future substantial disruption.19  The Court cautioned that 
any such forecast could not be based on either “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension”20 or a “desire to avoid this discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.” 21  
On the facts before it,  the Court found that school officials had 
acted not to avoid a substantial disruption at school, but simply to avoid 
discussion of the merits of the Vietnam War.  The Court noted that the 
school policy had “singled out for prohibition” 22 the wearing of black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War, not any other symbols that might be 
politically controversial.23 The Court held that a ban on the expression of 
one particular position was not constitutionally permissible in the absence 
of any evidence that the ban was necessary to avoid substantial 
interference with the school setting.24 
While articulating a “substantial interference” or “substantial 
disruption” standard by which to examine the constitutionality of school 
discipline, the decision in Tinker was not necessarily the model of clarity. 
First,  the Court did not clearly define what constitutes the “work” or 
“discipline” of school.  In addition, the Court did not clearly articulate the 
facts or factors that cause a disruption of the school environment to be 
“substantial” or “material.”25 The Court also indicated that discipline 
might be appropriate if a student’s speech “intrude[d],” 26 “impinge[d],”27 
                                           
13 Id.  at 507.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  at 513.  
19 Id.  at 514.  
20 Id.  at 508.  
21 Id.  at 509.  
22 Id.  at 510.  
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 The Court used different terminology in different sections of the opinion, referring 
to both “substantial disorder” and a “material disrupt[ion of] classwork” as 
constitutionally permissible grounds for discipline.  Id.  at 513. 
26 Id.  at 508.  
27 Id.  at 509.  
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“inva[ded],”28 or “collid[ed] with”29 the rights of other students, although 
the Court did not illustrate when such a circumstance might occur.  
In reviewing the specific facts, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’ 
act of wearing armbands had not been accompanied by any “disorder or 
disturbance”30 on the part of the plaintiffs.  The Court also maintained that 
there had been no evidence presented that any class was disrupted by the 
wearing of the armbands. 31 The Court further stated: “[o]utside the 
classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children wearing 
armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school 
premises.”32  
Justice Hugo Black dissented from the decision in Tinker.33 He 
principally took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the students’ 
symbolic speech had not interfered with schoolwork. While 
acknowledging that the wearing of black armbands had not prompted 
“obscene remarks or boisterous or loud disorder,” Justice Black argued 
that school officials were justified in disciplining the students because their 
speech had “diverted” other students’ attention from their classwork. 34 He 
opined that students could be disciplined for any speech that would cause 
other students to take their minds off of their schoolwork. 35 Any diversion 
from assigned classwork would be sufficient to allow school officials to 
regulate or discipline of student speech. Thus, the definition of a 
substantial disruption was a somewhat disputed issue among the members 
of the Court.  
In addition to being somewhat vague about the contours of a 
substantial disruption, the decision in Tinker also was unclear as to the 
proper scope or definition of the “school environment,”36 a highly relevant 
question when considering student speech in the digital age.  While the 
Court did use the clear image of a physical location – the space located 
within the “schoolhouse gate”37 – it also broadened the scope of the ruling 
beyond the four corners of a classroom. The Court stated that its ruling 
was not limited to “supervised or ordained discussion which takes places 
in the classroom,”38 but that students retained their First Amendment 
rights, consistent standards articulated, to express an opinion whether “in 
the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the 
                                           
28 Id.  at 513.  
29 Id.   
30 Id.  at 508.  
31 Id. The majority stated that no class had been disrupted in spite of evidence 
apparently in the record that a mathematics class had been “wrecked” by an in-class 
dispute with one of the students wearing a black armband. Id.  at 517 (Black, J. , 
dissenting).  
32 Id.  at 508.  
33 Id.  at 515 (Black, J. ,  dissenting).  
34 Id. at 518.  
35 Id.  (“And I repeat that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported 
schools,  kindergartens, grammar schools,  or high schools,  can defy and flout orders of 
school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new 
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary.”).  
36 Id.  at 506.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  at 512.  
[] A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 5 
authorized hours.”39 Yet, in another sentence, the Court stated that school 
officials have authority to regulate student speech, whether it takes place 
“in class or out of it,”40 if the speech creates a substantial interference or 
disruption. 
Of course, the Court cannot be faulted for not anticipating the 
digital age when it decided Tinker.  Yet, when the lower federal courts 
seek to determine the scope of school authority over student electronic 
speech that is created and distributed outside of school, some courts have 
resorted to reading the “tea leaves” of these particular statements in Tinker 
in an attempt to define what it means to be at school. 
Although the Court in Tinker used both the words “interference” 
and “disruption” to describe the effect of student speech on the school 
environment, the standard articulated in Tinker has become known as the 
“substantial disruption” standard.  Since Tinker,  the Court has never 
explicitly outlined the contours of the substantial disruption standard or 
otherwise clearly defined the phrase “substantial disruption.”41  
 
B.  The Court Determines That Students May Be Disciplined For Lewd or 
Obscene Speech That Is Uttered At School.  
 
More than fifteen year after Tinker,  the Court again addressed the 
issue of students’ First Amendment rights. In Bethel School District No. 
403 v. Fraser,  a young man filed suit alleging that school officials had 
violated his First Amendment rights by disciplining him for giving a 
speech at a school assembly that had been replete with sexual metaphor. 42 
The school had determined that the student’s conduct violated the school’s 
code of conduct, which used the language of Tinker in prohibiting any 
conduct that “materially and substantially interfere[d] with the educational 
process, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” 43 
The student prevailed both at the trial court and appellate level; both 
courts found that the school’s code of conduct was unconstitutionally 
vague and that the student’s speech had not caused a substantial disruption 
at school as required by Tinker.44 The Supreme Court reversed. 45  
The Court first distinguished the sexually-charged speech in Fraser 
from the black armbands of Tinker,  stating that the students in Tinker had 
not “intrude[d] upon the work of the school[] or the rights of other 
students.”46 The Court then expanded upon Tinker’s concept of the 
“work” of public schools, opining a “highly appropriate function of public 
school education [is] to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in 
                                           
39 Id.  at 512-13. 
40 Id.  at 513.  
41 See Lisa Smith-Butler,  Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies’ Free 
Speech Rights Against the Rights of the Rights of Victims to Be Left Alone When 
Regulating Off- Campus K-12 Student Cyberspeech, 37 NOVA L.  REV.  243, 303 (2013).  
42 478 U.S.  675.  
43 Id.  at 678.  
44 Fraser v.  Bethel Sch.  Dist.  No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.  1985).  
45 478 U.S.  675.  
46 Id.  at 680.  
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public discourse.”47 Noting that students’ First Amendment rights are not 
“coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”  the Court found 
that students do not have the same freedom in terms of their choice of 
words when expressing their opinion.48 While an adult in a public place 
has the right to choose lewd or obscene language to express a particular 
viewpoint, students are not permitted the “same latitude”  when at school.49 
Rather, a student’s “freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial 
views in schools and classrooms”50 was tempered by “society’s 
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior.”51 Thus, the Court held that the First Amendment 
allows school officials to discipline students for lewd or obscene speech 
that “undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mission.”52  
In concurring with the decision in Fraser,  Justice Brennan made 
the significant point that the Court’s decision was limited to lewd speech 
uttered at school. He stated that “had [the student] given the same speech 
outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized 
simply because government officials considered his language to be 
inappropriate.”53 In so stating, Justice Brennan affirmed the view of many 
lower courts that students can freely use lewd or obscene speech when not 
at school.54  
In addition, Justice Brennan repeatedly invoked the substantial 
disruption standard of Tinker,  characterizing both the language itself and 
its effect on the school environment as “disruptive.”55 Specifically, Justice 
Brennan stated that the school officials had sought to ensure that the 
assembly “proceed[ed] in an orderly manner”56 and that the discipline had 
been imposed because the student’s speech “disrupted the school’s 
educational process.”57 Thus, according to Justice Brennan, the Court in 
Fraser had applied Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. 58 
 
                                           
47 Id.  at 682.  
48 Id.  at 682-83. 
49 Id.  at 682. Referring to its own 1971 decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971), in which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds the criminal 
conviction of an individual who wore a jacket bearing the words, “Fuck the Draft” in 
public,  the Court noted that “’the First Amendment gives a high school student the 
classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband but not Cohen’s jacket.’” Id.  at 682-83, 
quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,  Granville Cent.  Sch. Dist. ,  607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d 
Cir.  1979) (Newman, J. ,  concurring).   
50 Id.  at 681.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  at 685.  
53 Id.  at 688, citing Cohen v. California,  403 U.S. 15 (1971).  
54 See e.g.,  Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442 (D.  Me. 1986) (holding that 
school could not discipline a student for “giving the finger” to a teacher he encountered 
in a restaurant parking lot,  stating: “The First Amendment protection of freedom of 
expression may not be made a casualty of the effort to force-feed good manners to the 
ruffians among us”).  
55 Id.  at 682.   
56 Id.  at 689.  
57 Id.  at 688.  
58 Indeed, Justice Marshall dissented from the decision in Fraser on the ground that 
the school had not shown a “disruption of the educational process.” Id.  at 690. 
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C.  The Supreme Court Finds That Schools May Exercise Editorial Control 
Over Student Speech That Appears In School-Sponsored Publications. 
 
Just two years after the Fraser decision, the Court again issued a 
significant decision in the arena of students’ First Amendment rights.  In 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,59 the Court held that school 
officials could “exercise[e] editorial control”60 over the contents of a 
school newspaper prepared by high school students as part of a journalism 
course. The students filed suit after the school principal deleted two stories 
from the newspaper.61 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that 
the school newspaper constituted a public forum and that school officials 
could not censor the contents of the paper in the absence of a substantial 
disruption under Tinker.62 The Court reversed. First,  the Court found that 
the school newspaper was not a public forum, but was a vehicle for 
students to learn and apply skills gained in a journalism course that existed 
as part of the school’s curriculum.63 The Court held that the pedagogical 
goal of producing the school newspaper distinguished it from a public 
forum such that school officials had not “relinquish[ed] school control 
over that activity.”64 
The Court’s determination that the school newspaper was not a 
public forum was significant because, in the Court’s view, the remaining 
issue was only whether school officials had exercised their rights to 
regulate the content of the newspaper in a “reasonable manner.” 65 The 
question of the reasonableness, the Court stated, was the standard by 
which the case was to be decided, not the substantial disruption standard 
established in Tinker.66 The Court characterized Tinker as a case involving 
“[t]he question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate 
particular student speech.”67 The Court then contrasted Kuhlmeier as a 
case involving “the question whether the First Amendment requires a 
school affirmatively to promote particular speech.” 68 Finding that Tinker 
was factually distinguishable, the Court then explicitly created a separate 
constitutionally-permissible category of regulation over student speech. It 
described this category as control over “school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, 
                                           
59 484 U.S.  260 (1988).  
60 Id. at 273.  
61 Id.  at 263. The two stories involved topics of teen pregnancy and divorce.  Id.  
62 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. ,  795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir.  1986).  
63 Id.  at 269-70. 
64 Id.  at 270.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  The Court in Kuhlmeier also characterized Tinker as delineating the ability of 
school officials “to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on 
school premises.” Id.  at 271. 
67 Id.  at 270.  
68 Id.  at 270-71. The Court made clear that the Tinker did not apply, stating its 
conclusion “that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may 
punish student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school 
may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.” Id.  
at 272-73. 
8 A MISSED OPPORTUNITY [] 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school.”69 In this “second form of student expression,” 
the Court granted school officials great discretion, finding that school 
officials do not violate the First Amendment “so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”70 
As he had done in Fraser,  Justice Brennan again wrote a separate 
opinion, although in Kuhlmeier he dissented from the decision.71 Joined by 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan sharply criticized the 
majority’s decision to “abandon[] Tinker”72 and in favor of the creation of 
a second category of permissible regulation over student speech.  He 
argued that the majority’s decision to divide student speech into 
“incidental” and “school-sponsored” expression had no basis in precedent.   
In so arguing, Justice Brennan discussed Fraser at length, asserting 
that, just two years earlier in Fraser,  the Court had “faithfully applied 
Tinker.”73 The majority in Kuhlmeier addressed that contention in a 
footnote, disagreeing with Justice Brennan that the decision in Fraser had 
been grounded in Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.74 Justice 
Brennan, however, argued that Tinker granted school officials sufficient 
authority to regulate student expression that would interfere with a 
school’s pedagogical or curricular goals.75  
In doing so, Justice Brennan employed an expansive definition of 
the phrase “material disruption,” stating that school officials could censor 
student expression appearing in a school newspaper if the content 
contained “poor grammar, writing or research because to reward such 
expression would ‘materially disrupt’ the newspaper’s curricular 
purpose.”76 He distinguished such constitutionally-permissible censorship 
from censorship that was designed to shield the newspaper’s readers (the 
audience) or the newspaper’s sponsor (the school) from the effect of the 
expression. Citing evidence from the record, Justice Brennan concluded 
that, on the facts before the Court, it was clear that school officials had 
acted to shield the audience from material that they deemed to be “too 
sensitive” or “unsuitable” for the audience of student-readers. That form 
of censorship, he determined, was unconstitutional.   
  
                                           
69 Id. at 271.  
70 Id.  at 273.  
71 Id.  at 277-91 (Brennan, J. ,  Marshall,  J. ,  Blackmun, J. ,  dissenting).  
72 Id.  at 282.  
73 Id.   
74 Id.  at 271, n. 4,  quoting Fraser,  393 U.S. at 513 (The decision in Fraser rested on 
the “vulgar,” “lewd,” and “plainly offensive” character of a speech delivered at an 
official school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to “materially 
disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”).  
75 Id.  at 283-84. The majority interpreted Tinker’s reference to speech that invaded 
the rights of other students as referring to speech of one student regarding another student 
that could give rise to tort liability on the part of the school.  Id. at 273 n.5.  
76 Id.  at 284.  
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D.  The Court Allows School Officials To Discipline Students For On-
Campus Speech That Promotes Illegal Drug Use. 
 
After the decision in Kuhlmeier,  it was nearly twenty years before 
the Court decided another student speech case.  In a 2007 decision, Morse 
v. Frederick,  the Court ruled that school officials may constitutionally 
regulate student speech that reasonably is perceived as promoting illegal 
drug use.77 In Morse,  school officials had allowed students to leave school 
grounds during school hours, although supervised by school employees, in 
order to watch the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay pass by on the street.  While 
standing on the sidewalk, a group of students unfurled a homemade banner 
displaying the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” 78 When the school 
principal saw the banner, she directed the students to take it down, and all 
except one student complied.79 The principal confiscated the banner and 
suspended the student for displaying a message that promoted illegal drug 
use, a message that violated school policy prohibiting such advocacy of 
illegal drug use.80 He then brought suit, alleging a violation of his First 
Amendment rights.81 
The lower courts were divided; the federal district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the school on the ground that the principal 
had reasonably interpreted the banner as promoting illegal drug use in 
contravention of the school’s drug abuse prevention policy.82 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that school officials had been 
unable to establish that the student’s speech materially disrupted the school 
environment.83 
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,  holding that the discipline 
had been constitutionally imposed.84 In so holding, the Court first 
addressed the student’s argument that the case was not a “school speech 
case” because the student was not on school grounds.85 The Court 
summarily rejected that argument, stating that the student could not “stand 
in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-
sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.”86 Although the Court 
found that the particular facts of the case fell squarely within the student 
speech cases, the Court did acknowledge that “there is some uncertainty at 
the outer boundaries as to when the courts should apply school speech 
precedents.”87  
                                           
77 551 U.S.  393 (2007).  
78 Id.  A photograph of the banner being displayed can be found at 
https://reedsmassmedia.wordpress.com/2010/09/10/morse-v-frederick-bong-hits-4-jesus/ 
(last visited Sept.  28, 2016).  
79 551 U.S.  at 398.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 399.  
82 Frederick v. Morse, 2003 WL 25274689 (D. Alaska, May 29, 2003).  
83 Frederick v. Morse, 493 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.  2006).  
84 551 U.S.  393.  
85 551 U.S.  at 400.  
86 Id. at 401.  
87 Id.,  citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd.,  393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir.  
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Having disposed with the student’s argument that his speech was 
beyond the authority of school officials, the Court next turned to the issue 
whether school officials had acted within constitutional limits.  The Court 
again affirmed that students do not lose their First Amendment rights at 
school, but noted that the “nature of those rights is what is appropriate for 
children in school.”88 Returning the debate that had taken place twenty 
years earlier between the Justices who decided both Fraser and Kuhlmeier, 
the Court in Morse noted that. While the “mode of analysis employed in 
Fraser [wa]s not entirely clear,”89 it could discern two important 
principles from the decision. First, due to the “special characteristics of 
the school environment,” the First Amendment rights of students may be 
regulated in ways that would not be constitutional if imposed upon either 
adults or students in other settings.90 The Court thus affirmed Justice 
Brennan’s conclusion that the student in Fraser could not have been 
disciplined by school officials had he given the speech outside of the 
“school context.”91 Second, notwithstanding Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Fraser and later dissent in Kuhlmeier,  the Court in Morse 
found that, in Fraser,  it had not “conduct[ed] the ‘substantial disruption’ 
analysis prescribed by Tinker.”92 Thus, the Court made clear that Fraser 
had established a content-based category of unprotected student speech 
under which lewd or indecent speech uttered at school is subject to 
discipline. 
The Court in Morse also reviewed its decision in Kuhlmeier and 
reaffirmed that school officials do not violate the First Amendment by 
exercising control over student speech expressed in school-sponsored 
activities as long as the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”93 Further, the Court interpreted the decision in 
Kuhlmeier to be consistent with Fraser in two important respects.  First, 
school officials have the ability to regulate student speech at school in 
ways although they “could not censor similar speech outside the school.”94 
Second, the substantial disruption standard of Tinker “is not the only basis 
for restricting student speech.”95  
Having concluded that the Court’s precedents allowed for the 
creation of certain categories of regulated student speech, the Court then 
created an additional content-based category by allowing restrictions on 
student speech that could reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal 
drug use.96 
                                                                                                           
2004).  
88 Id.  at 406.  
89 Id.  at 404.  
90 Id.  at 404-05. 
91 Id. at 405.  
92 Id. ,  citing Kuhlmeier,  484 U.S. at 271, n. 4 (the majority in Kuhlmeier voices 
disagreement with Justice Brennan in terms of the analysis conducted in Fraser).  
93 Id.  at 405.  
94 Id.  at 406.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  at 408. Justice Thomas concurred in the result,  writing separately to argue that 
Tinker is unconstitutional because the history of public education suggests that the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.” 
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Justice Alito concurred in the Court’s decision in Morse,  but added 
a significant note of caution. Specifically, Justice Alito wrote separately to 
reject the argument made by school officials that they were entitled to 
restrict any student speech that “interferes with a school’s educational 
mission.”97 Justice Alito wisely recognized the dangerousness of such a 
position, since any particular school’s educational mission could be 
defined – and re-defined – to fit the political, social or moral views of 
particular administrators. 98 He emphasized that the Court’s ruling in favor 
of school officials was not premised on authority to regulate student 
speech that interfered with an educational mission but, rather, on the 
specific and special characteristics of the school setting.  On the facts 
before the Court, the “threat to the physical safety of students”99 was an 
important characteristic of the school environment that had been 
implicated by the student’s arguably pro-drug use banner. Employing 
language that is particularly on-point when one considers the threats of 
violence such as school shootings, Justice Alito stated: 
 
School attendance can expose students to threats to their 
physical safety that they would not otherwise face. Outside 
of school, parents can attempt to protect their children in 
many ways and may take steps to monitor and exercise 
control over the persons with whom their children 
associate. Similarly, students, when not in school, may be 
able to avoid threatening individuals and situations. During 
school hours, however, parents are not present to provide 
protection and guidance, and students’ movements and their 
ability to choose the persons with whom they spend time 
are severely restricted. Students may be compelled on a 
daily basis to spend time at close quarters with other 
students who may do them harm. Experience shows that 
schools can be places of special danger. 100 
 
 Justice Alito concluded that, in cases involving threats of violence, 
school officials “must have greater authority to intervene.”101 He 
specifically cited Tinker’s substantial disruption standard as providing 
authority for school officials to intervene “before actual violence 
erupts.”102 
 
                                                                                                           
Id.  at 410-11. This argument is firmly grounded in the physicality of being at school,  
where school officials are deemed to be standing in loco parentis when children are at 
school.  Id. at 419.  Thus, under Justice Thomas’s interpretation of the First Amendment, 
school officials should have no ability to regulate student speech that occurs outside of 
school,  where the children’s parents have the ability to control and discipline them.  
97 Id. at 423, quoting Brief of the Petitioners and Amicus Curiae.  
98 Id.  
99 Id.  at 424.  
100 Id.   
101 Id.  at 425.  
102 Id.  
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II.  THE CIRCUIT COURTS ENTER THE DIGITAL AGE.  
 
A.  The Second Circuit Establishes A “Reasonable Foreseeability” Test.  
 
Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court decided Morse,  a 
case involving student speech appearing on a crudely-made, hand-painted 
sign, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case involving student 
speech using an entirely different mode of communication – an electronic 
“instant message” (IM) distributed via the Internet. 103 Thus, only days 
after the decision in Morse,  the lower federal courts embarked on the 
difficult task of applying the Supreme Court’s “twentieth century” student 
speech cases to the predominant “twenty-first century” mode of 
communication – speech that is created and distributed electronically. 
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central 
School District,104 the parents of an eighth-grade student sued after their 
son was disciplined for transmitting to other students an instant message 
(IM) icon with a drawing depicting the shooting of the student’s English 
teacher. The student argued that, because he created and distributed the 
IM outside of school, his speech was beyond the authority of school 
officials.105 The Second Circuit rejected that argument, holding that school 
officials did have the authority over the student’s off-campus speech 
because it was “reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to the 
attention of school authorities”106 or “reach”107 the school property. The 
Second Circuit then applied the Tinker test and determined that school 
officials had reasonably forecast a substantial disruption.  
The Second Circuit first examined the question whether the 
student’s speech constituted a “true threat” under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Watts v. United States.108 In Watts, the Court held that a 
federal statute criminalizing threats against the President of the United 
States required the government to establish that the speech constituted a 
“true threat.”109 The Second Circuit concluded that it need not consider 
whether to apply Watts because, in its view, Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard granted school officials “significantly broader authority to 
sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.”110 Irrespective of 
the true threat analysis, student speech that advocated violence against a 
teacher had the potential to materially and substantially disrupt the school 
environment.111 
However, the three-judge panel in Wisniewski struggled with the 
proper test to determine whether Tinker applied to student speech created 
                                           
103 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent.  Sch. Dist. ,  494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.  
2007).  
104 Id.  
105 Id.  at 39 (the creation of the IM message outside of school did not “insulate [the 
student] from discipline”).  
106 Id.  at 38.  
107 Id.  at 39.  
108 394 U.S.  705 (1969).  
109 Id.  at 37-38.  
110 Id.  at 38.   
111 Id.  at 39.  
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and distributed outside of school. The “panel [was] divided”112 about 
whether, in the case of off-campus speech, school officials were required 
to make any additional showing about the speech’s connection to the 
school environment or whether that issue was unnecessary in light of the 
fact that the speech had be viewed by school officials. While noting the 
panel’s disagreement,  the Second Circuit held that, on the specific facts 
before it,  it was “reasonably foreseeable that the IM icon would come to 
the attention of school authorities,”113 thus providing authority for school 
officials to discipline the student under Tinker.  The requirement of 
reasonable foreseeability – “both of communication to school authorities… 
and the risk of substantial disruption”114 – was satisfied because of the 
threatening content of the IM icon and its “extensive distribution”115 to 
fifteen other students.  
Thus, Wisniewski established a “threshold”116 test that school 
officials must satisfy before the Tinker analysis is undertaken. This 
threshold test requires school officials to demonstrate “reasonable 
foreseeability” that a student’s off-campus speech would come to the 
attention of school authorities.   
In March 2008, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of 
certiorari that had been filed in in Wisniewski.117 
In a case decided one year later, the Second Circuit again applied 
its “reasonable foreseeability” test to determine whether school officials 
could exercise authority over a student’s electronic off-campus speech. In 
Doninger v. Niehoff,118 a student who was a member of student 
government was disciplined after she posted a message on a publicly 
accessible blog that contained misleading information and derogatory 
language about an upcoming school event, a “battle of the bands” 
concert.119 The student erroneously told the school community that the 
concert had been cancelled “due to douchebags in central office”120 and 
urged students and parents to flood the school’s administrative offices with 
complaints via email or telephone, with the expressed goal of “piss[ing] 
[school officials] off more.”121 Due to the student’s efforts, school 
administrators did receive a deluge of complaints from students and 
parents, which caused school administrators to spend significant time both 
in scheduling the concert and correcting misinformation distributed by the 
student.122  
Some days after the incident, the student’s blog posting was 
                                           
112 Id.   
113 Id.  
114 Id.  at 40.  
115 Id.  at 39.  
116 Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. ,  782 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.  2013) 
(characterizing the Second Circuit’s decision as establishing a “threshold test”).  
117 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent.  Sch. Dist. ,  552 U.S. 1296 
(2008).  
118 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.  2008).  
119 Id.  
120 Id.  at 45.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 46.  
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brought to the attention of the school superintendent, whose adult son 
found the posting on the Internet.123 At the time, school officials took no 
action; however, approximately three weeks later, when the student took 
steps to accept a nomination to serve as Senior Class Secretary, the school 
principal determined that the student should be prohibited from running 
for that office as discipline for her speech. 124  
The student’s mother then sued.  The federal district court denied 
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff 
had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits, 125 
and the plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit.  
The Second Circuit first noted that the Supreme Court had not yet 
addressed the “scope of a school’s authority”126 over student off-campus 
speech. Relying on its earlier decision in Wisniewski,  the court then 
articulated two, slightly different “foreseeability tests” to determine the 
scope of school authority over off-campus speech. First,  the court stated 
that a student may be disciplined for off-campus speech that “’would 
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment’ at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus 
expression might also reach campus.”127 Later in the opinion, the court 
stated that school discipline is permissible when “it [is] reasonably 
foreseeable that the [speech will] come to the attention of school 
authorities and that it would create a risk of substantial disruption.” 128  
The court did not explain whether the two articulations – authority 
over off-campus speech that either “reach[es] campus” or “come[s] to the 
attention of school authorities” – are in fact the same measure or test.  
Compounding the confusion, the Second Circuit applied both articulations 
to the facts of the case. The court first stated that “it was reasonably 
foreseeable that [the blog posting] would reach school property.”129 Later 
in the same paragraph, the court stated that “it was reasonably foreseeable 
that … school administrators would be aware of [the blog posting].” 130 
Based on these two, slightly different articulations, the Second Circuit 
concluded that school officials had authority over the student’s off-campus 
speech. 
The Second Circuit then concluded that school officials had 
correctly applied Tinker.131 The court did not find that an actual substantial 
disruption had occurred at school, only that the student’s speech had 
created a foreseeable risk of a future disruption.  The court cited three 
reasons for this finding. 132 First,  the court found that the student’s use of 
“plainly offensive” language – such as calling school officials 
                                           
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D.  Conn. 2007).  
126 527 F.3d at 48.  
127 Id.  
128 Id.  at 50.  
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  at 50.  
132 Id.  at 50-52.  
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“douchebags” – inflamed the controversy rather than resolving it. 133 
Second, the student’s misleading characterization of the controversy had 
led to a “deluge of calls or emails” that caused school officials to “miss or 
be late to school-related activities” and could have caused further 
disruption had it continued. 134 Third, the court found that the student’s 
position in student government leader warranted discipline.135 
After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the case continued to be 
litigated in the federal courts.  In January 2009, the federal district court 
granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the 
case. 136 The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant 
of summary judgment.137 The Supreme Court then denied the student’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.138 
 
B.  The Third Circuit Avoids The Scope of Authority Issue, But Members 
Of The Court Have Strong Differences Of Opinion. 
 
Shortly after the Second Circuit issued its decision in Doninger,  the 
Third Circuit began to wrestle with the scope of school authority over 
student off-campus electronic speech.139 In 2011, the Third Circuit,  sitting 
en banc,  decided two student off-campus speech cases that had remarkably 
similar facts. However, the Third Circuit’s twin decisions did not clarify 
the constitutional limits of school officials’ authority to discipline students 
for off-campus electronic speech. To the contrary, the decisions revealed a 
deep divide among the judges on the issue.  
In the first case, Layshock v. Hermitage School District,140 a high 
school senior, Justin Layshock, used his grandmother’s home computer to 
create a “parody profile” of the school principal that Justin then posted on 
MySpace.com. 141 The parody profile contained numerous outlandish 
statements purportedly written by the principal.142 In creating the profile, 
Justin copied a photograph of the principal from the district’s website, 
                                           
133 Id.  at 50-51.  
134 Id.  at 51.  
135 Id.  at 52.   
136 Doninger v. Niehoff,  594 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 2009).  
137 Doninger v. Niehoff,  643 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.  2011).  
138 Doninger v. Niehoff,  132 S.Ct. 499 (2011).  
139 Layshock ex. rel.  Layshock v.  Hermitage Sch. Dist. ,  650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.  
2011); J.S.  ex. rel.  Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.  Dist. ,  650 F.3d 656 (3d Cir.  2011).  
140 650 F.3d 205.  
141 Id.  at 208-09. 
142 Id.  at 208. The parody profile included the following statements,  among others:  
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg 
Ever been drunk: big number of times 
Ever been called a Tease: big whore 
Ever been Beaten up: big fag 
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart 
Number of Drugs I have taken: big.  
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which he then pasted into the parody profile. 143 In addition, there was 
some evidence that Justin had accessed the profile on a school computer 
and shown it to a few students during school hours.144 After Justin first 
posted his profile, other students created and posted at least three 
additional profiles of the principal, all of which were more vulgar than 
Justin’s parody profile.145 
A few days after the first profile was posted, the principal learned 
of the profile’s existence from his daughter. 146 Finding all of the profiles to 
be “’degrading’ and ‘shocking,’”147 the principal asked the school to 
commence an investigation, which ultimately identified Justin as the 
creator of the first profile. 148 The district disciplined Justin for violating 
the school code of conduct, including prohibitions on the use of obscene 
language.149 Justin was given a 10-day suspension, sent to an alternative 
education program for the remainder of his senior year, banned from all 
extracurricular activities and prohibited from attending his graduation 
ceremony. 150  
Justin and his parents sued.151 The federal district court granted 
summary judgment in Justin’s favor on a First Amendment claim.152 A 
three-judge panel of the Third Circuit then affirmed. 153 The court found 
discipline was not warranted under Fraser because no lewd or obscene 
language had been used at school.154 The court also determined that the 
school had not presented evidence of any substantial disruption sufficient 
to allow discipline under Tinker.155 However, the panel opinion was 
vacated pending a rehearing of the case by the Third Circuit sitting en 
banc.156  
In June 2011, the Third Circuit issued it en banc decision in which 
it unanimously affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Justin.157 The Third Circuit framed the issue presented in the case 
as follows: 
 
We are asked to determine if a school district can punish a 
student for expressive conduct that originated outside of the 
schoolhouse, did not disturb the school environment and 
                                           
143 Id. at 208-09.  
144 Id.  at 209.  
145 Id. at 208.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  at 209.  
148 Id.  
149 Id.  at 209-10. 
150 Id.  at 210.  
151 Id.  
152 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.  Dist. ,  496 F. Supp.  2d 587 (W.D. Pa.  2007).  
153 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.  2010).  
154 Id.  at 263.  
155 Id.  at 260-61. The Third Circuit noted that the school district had not disputed on 
appeal the district court’s finding that it had failed to provide sufficient evidence of a 
substantial disruption as would be necessary to constitutionally discipline a student under 
Tinker.  Id.  
156 593 F.3d 249.  
157 650 F.3d 205.  
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was not related to any school sponsored event. We hold 
that, under these circumstances, the First Amendment 
prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard to 
impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline.158 
 
At the outset, the Third Circuit noted that, on appeal, the school 
district had abandoned any argument that its discipline of Justin was 
constitutional under Tinker.159 Rather than relying on Tinker,  the school 
district argued that its discipline of Justin was constitutional under 
Fraser.160 The school district acknowledged that Fraser was limited to the 
use of lewd and obscene language at school; however, the district argued 
that Justin’s act of entering the district’s website to cut and paste the 
principal’s picture constituted an entry into school property sufficient to 
treat the profile as on-campus speech.161 The school district also argued 
that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the profile would come to the 
attention of school authorities, thus employing the language of 
Doninger.162 In making this argument, the school district sought to 
broaden the scope of school authority to include discipline under Fraser 
for any off-campus lewd or offensive speech so long as it could be 
reasonably foreseen that the lewd speech would come to the attention of 
school authorities.  
The Third Circuit rejected this argument. 163 It distinguished 
Doninger specifically on the ground that the Second Circuit had applied 
the foreseeability test to determine scope of authority to discipline a 
student for substantially disruptive speech under Tinker.164 In addition, the 
Third Circuit was quite clear that it had discussed Doninger only because 
the district raised the argument and, importantly, that it did not necessarily 
endorse the Second Circuit’s position, stating: “[I]n citing Doninger,  we 
do not suggest that we agree with that court’s conclusion that the student’s 
out of school expressive conduct was not protected by the First 
Amendment there.”165 Ultimately the Third Circuit concluded that Fraser 
clearly applied only to the of lewd or obscene speech uttered at school and 
that school officials had no authority to impose discipline for a student’s 
lewd speech created and posted electronically outside of school.166 
While the en banc decision in Layshock was unanimous, the judges 
of the Third Circuit clearly did not agree on the scope of authority 
question. That disagreement was apparent in the second student speech 
opinion that the court issued simultaneously with the Layshock decision.167 
                                           
158 Id.  at 207.  
159 Id.  at 214. In granting summary judgment in favor of Justin, the district court had 
stated that the school district could not establish a “nexus” between the parody profile 
and any substantial disruption at school.  Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600.  
160 Id.  
161 Id.  at 214 & 216.   
162 Id.  
163 Id.  at 219.  
164 Id.  at 217-18. 
165 Id.  at 218.  
166 Id.  at 219.  
167 J.S. ex. rel.  Snyder v.  Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. ,  650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir.  2011).  
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In the second case, J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District,168 the court ruled 8-6 in favor of the student, although five of the 
eight judges who comprised the majority joined in a separate concurring 
opinion.169  
In Snyder,  as in Layshock,  the student – identified as J.S. – had 
created an obscenity-laced fake profile of the school principal that J.S. 
then posted on MySpace.170 The profile was created outside of school and, 
although it was briefly publicly available, J.S. changed the accessibility of 
the profile to “private,” thus limiting access to about twenty-two other 
students who were friends on MySpace. 171 The principal learned of the 
profile from another student and, due to the private setting in MySpace, 
was able to review its contents only after asking that student to print out a 
copy of the profile and bring it to school.172 After reviewing the profile, 
the principal and other school officials disciplined J.S. 173 
She and her parents then sued, claiming a violation of her First 
Amendment rights.174 Unlike the Layshock case, the federal district court 
determined that the school’s discipline of J.S. had been unconstitutional 
under Fraser because the speech, although lewd and vulgar, could not be 
considered “on-campus” speech.175 A three-judge panel of the Third 
Circuit first affirmed the district court’s ruling, then vacated the decision 
pending a rehearing en banc.176 After additional briefing and oral 
argument, a narrow majority of the Third Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s ruling on the First Amendment issue and remanded the case to the 
lower court for further proceedings.177 
The majority in Snyder avoided the central issue whether school 
officials have authority to discipline students for off-campus speech, 
stating that it would “assume, with deciding, that Tinker applies to [off-
campus] speech.”178 In other words, the court treated the student’s speech 
as on-campus speech contemplated in Tinker.  The majority did note the 
student’s argument that school officials’ ability to discipline students was 
                                           
168 Id.  
169 Id.  at 936 (Smith, J. ,  McKee, C.J. ,  Sloviter,  J. , Fuentes, J.  and Hardiman, J. ,  
concurring).  
170 Id.  at 920-21. The profile was written as if it described the life of a “bi-sexual 
Alabama middle school principal named ‘M-Hoe.’” Id.  at 920. The profile listed the 
fictious principal’s interests as: “’detention, being a tight ass,  riding the fraintrain, 
spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla),  baseball,  my golden pen, fucking 
in my office,  hitting on students and their parents.’” Id.  
171 Id.  at 921.  
172 Id.  
173 Id.  at 922.  
174 J.S. ex. rel.  Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist,  No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 
4279517 at *3 (M.D. Pa.,  Sept.  11, 2008).  
175 Id.  at *7-8.  The federal district court distinguished the district court’s decision in 
Layshock,  which had found no constitutional basis for discipline, on the ground that the 
profile created by J.S. “much more vulgar and offensive.”  Id.  at *8.  
176 J.S. ex. rel.  Snyder v.  Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. ,  593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir.  2010).  
177 650 F.3d 915.  The court did affirm the district court’s judgments that the district’s 
policies were not void for vagueness and that the defendants did not violate any 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights Id.  at 920.  
178 Id.  at 926.  
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limited to the schoolhouse and acknowledged that the argument had “some 
appeal,” but deemed it unnecessary to reach the issue in order to decide in 
the student’s favor.179 Rather, the majority found that, even assuming that 
Tinker applied, the district had not presented any evidence of a substantial 
disruption that would warrant the discipline imposed on J.S.180 The 
majority also determined that the lower court had erred in applying Fraser 
to the student’s speech, stating that “Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard [could 
not] be extended to justify a school’s punishment of J.S. for use of profane 
language outside the school, during non-school hours.”181 
Judge D. Brooks Smith wrote a concurring opinion, joined by four 
other judges, in which he directly addressed the scope of authority 
question avoided by the majority.182 Judge Smith gave a clear “No” 
answer to the scope of authority question, stating that “ the First 
Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same 
extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”183 Using 
the Supreme Court’s own language, Judge Smith concluded that Tinker’s 
holding “is expressly grounded in ‘the special characteristics of the school 
environment’”184 and grants limited authority to “’prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.’”185 He predicted dire consequences if the authority 
granted to school officials under Tinker was extended too far, stating: 
 
Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a 
precedent with ominous implications. Doing so would 
empower schools to regulate students’ expressive activity 
no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what 
subject matter it involves – so long as it causes a substantial 
disruption at school. … Suppose a high school student, 
while at home after school hours, were to write a blog entry 
defending gay marriage. Suppose further that several of the 
student’s classmates got wind of the entry, took issue with 
it,  and caused a significant disturbance at school. While the 
school could clearly punish the students who acted 
disruptively, if Tinker were held to apply to off-campus 
speech, the school could also punish the student whose blog 
entry brought about the disruption. That cannot be, nor is 
it,  the law.186 
 
As Judge Smith framed the issue, the difficult question was not whether 
                                           
179 Id.  at 926, n.3.  
180 Id.  at 928.  
181 Id.  at 932.  
182 Id.  at 936.  
183 Id.  
184 Id.  at 937, quoting Tinker,  393 U.S.  at 506.  
185 Id.  at 937, quoting Tinker,  393 U.S. at 507.  Judge Smith argued that,  in Morse,  
Justice Alito himself had recognized that Tinker did not extend to off-campus speech, 
noting Justice Alito’s statement that “Tinker allows schools to regulate ‘in-school student 
speech … in a way that would not be constitutional in other settings.’” Id.  at 938, quoting 
Morse,  551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J. ,  concurring).   
186 Id.  at 939.  
20 A MISSED OPPORTUNITY [] 
Tinker could extend to “off-campus” speech but the test to determine 
whether speech has occurred “on” or “off” campus. 187 Using the example 
of a student who might email a teacher from home, Judge Smith opined 
that speech by a student that is “intentionally directed towards a school” 
would be considered “on-campus” speech and thus subject to the authority 
of school officials.188  
Yet Judge Smith soundly rejected the Second Circuit’s 
foreseeability test,  stating that “a bare foreseeability standard could be 
stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that 
happened to discuss school-related matters.”189 He rejected the notion that 
truly off-campus speech somehow “mutate[s]” into on-campus speech by 
reaching the campus.190 As to the fake profile created by J.S., Judge Smith 
determined that the profile did not constitute on-campus speech that was 
subject to discipline under Tinker. 191  
As stated above, the Third Circuit was highly divided in the Snyder 
case. Six of the fourteen judges dissented from the decision to affirm the 
lower court’s ruling on the First Amendment issue.192 The dissenting 
judges applied Tinker to the student’s speech, arguing that school officials 
could have reasonably forecasted a future disruption due to the student’s 
speech.193 In particular, the dissenting judges forcefully argued that 
“personal and harmful attacks on educators and school officials” are 
always disruptive to the school community.194 A great deal of the 
dissenting opinion was devoted specifically to outlining reasons why 
students ought to be subject to discipline for “off-campus hostile and 
offensive student internet speech that is directed at school officials.”195 
And the dissenters also opined that school authority should extend to 
speech created by students outside of school due to the “near-constant 
student access to social networking sites on and off campus.” 196 
Indeed, in the view of some Third Circuit judges, the two decisions 
in Layshock and Snyder were “competing opinions”197 that had created 
uncertainty on the scope of authority issue.198 Judge Kent A. Jordan wrote 
a concurring opinion in Layshock specifically to assert his strong view 
that, under Tinker,  school officials could exercise authority over a 
                                           
187 Id.  at 940.  
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
190 Id.  
191 Id.  Among the facts demonstrating that the speech was entirely off-campus was 
that it had been created outside of school,  had not been sent by the student to any school 
employee, had been accessible only to a limited number of individuals due to the “private 
setting in MySpace, and that school computers blocked access to MySpace.  Id.  
192 Id.  at 941.  
193 Id.  at 945.  
194 Id.  at 946.  
195 Id.  at 950.  
196 Id.  at 951-52. 
197 Id.  at 220 (Jordan, J. ,  Vanaskie,  J. ,  concurring).  
198 For a detailed discussion of the disagreement among the Third Circuit judges, 
including a tabular description of the judges’ position in Snyder, see Black, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined. ,  at 541.  
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student’s off-campus speech.199 Judge Jordan used somewhat strong 
language to criticize two of the opinions in Snyder. He criticized the 
majority in Snyder for failing to address the scope of authority question 
and simply “assuming” that Tinker applied.200 Judge Smith’s position was 
criticized on the ground that the “’off-campus versus on-campus’ 
distinction is artificial and untenable in the world we live in today.”201  
Judge Jordan found that the “omnipresence”202 of speech 
communicated via “wireless internet access, smart phones, tablet 
computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-of-
consciousness communications via Twitter”203 renders any rule based on 
“physical boundaries of a school campus”204 unworkable. Judge Jordan 
advocated that school officials be given broad authority to “forecast how 
poisonous accusations lobbed over the internet are likely to play out within 
the school community”205 and to impose discipline whenever school 
officials might reasonable forecast a disruption. Although he did make 
note of the Supreme Court’s reference to an “uncertainty at the outer 
boundaries”206 of what constitutes speech subject to school authority, 
Judge Jordan made no effort to define that outer boundary or otherwise 
articulate a limitation on the scope of the authority of school officials.  
The Supreme Court denied petitions for writs of certiorari that had 
been filed in both Snyder and Layshock. 207 
 
C.  The Fourth and Eighth Circuits Adopt the Second Circuit’s 
“Reasonable Foreseeability” Test.  
 
In a decision issued just one month after the Third Circuit’s 
fractured rulings in Layshock and Snyder,  the Fourth Circuit continued to 
complicate the scope of authority issue in a case that involved 
cyberbullying.208 A high school student, Kara Kowalski, had created a 
discussion group webpage entitled “S.A.S.H.,” which other students 
recognized as an acronym for the phrase “Students Against Shay’s 
Herpes,” where “Shay” referred to another student at school. 209 Kowalski 
then invited about 100 members of the school community to join the 
group.210 Approximately two dozen high school students did join the group 
and many of them posted derogatory comments and photographs of Shay, 
the target of the webpage. 211 School officials were unaware of the page 
                                           
199 Id.  at 219 (Jordan, J. ,  Vanaskie,  J. ,  concurring).  
200 Id.  at 220.  
201 Id.  at 220, citing Snyder,  650 F.3d at 947-48 & n.4 (Fisher,  J. ,  dissenting).  
202 Id.  at 221.  
203 Id.  at 220.  
204 Id.  at 221.  
205 Id.  at 222.  
206 Id.  at 220 n.2.  
207 Blue Mountain Sch.  Dist.  v.  Snyder, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012).  
208 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch.,  652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir.  2011).  
209 Id.  at 567.  
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 568. One student posted photographs of Shay. Id.  On one photograph he 
drew red dots on the girl’s face to simulate herpes. Id. In another photograph of Shay, he 
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until it was brought to their attention by Shay’s parents. 212  
After conducting an investigation, school officials determined that 
the student had violated the school’s written bullying and harassment 
policy and punished her by, among other things, issuing a 90-day social 
suspension and prohibiting her from participating on the cheerleading 
squad for the remainder of the school year. 213 
The student then sued both the school district and several school 
officials, asserting both First Amendment and Due Process claims.214 After 
the federal district court dismissed all claims, 215 the student appealed, 
claiming that “school administrators had no power to discipline her” 216 
because her speech had been created and distributed off-campus. Citing 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Doninger,  school officials argued that 
school officials had authority over the student’s speech because it was 
foreseeable that it would “reach the school.” 217 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that school officials did have 
authority over the student’s speech and that the discipline had comported 
with Tinker.   
However, the rationale behind the Fourth Circuit’s determination 
on the scope of authority issue was somewhat unclear.  In addressing the 
scope of authority question, the Fourth Circuit stated: 
 
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s 
interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students 
when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse 
gate. But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are 
satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman 
High School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong 
to justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out 
their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.218 
 
The Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “nexus” has led some courts 
and commentators to conclude that, on the scope of authority issue, the 
Fourth Circuit had created a different test than the foreseeability test 
articulated in Doninger.219 This so-called “nexus” test apparently examines 
                                                                                                           
added a caption that read “portrait of a whore.” Id.  
212 Id.  
213 Id.  at 568-69. 
214 Id.  at 567.  
215 Id.  
216 Id.  at 570-71. 
217 Id.  at 571.  
218 Id.  at 573.  
219 Wynar, supra note 116, at 1068; Margaret A. Hazel,  Student Cyber-Speech After 
Kowalski v.  Berkeley County Schools,  63 S.C.  L.  REV.  1081, 1087 (2012) (describing 
Kowalski as adopting a “sufficient nexus approach”);  Daniel Marcus-Toll,  Tinker Gone 
Viral:Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital 
Student Speech, 82 FORDHAM L.  REV.  3395 (2014); Mary Noe, Sticks and Stones Will 
Break My Bones But Whether Words Harm Will Be Decided By A Judge, 88 N.Y.  STATE 
BAR J.  39, 40 (Jan. 2016).  But see Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. ,  at 
551 (“The Second, Fourth,  and Eighth Circuits all considered the question of the 
reasonable foreseeability that a student’s off-campus speech would reach the school 
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the strength of the connection between the speech and school. 220 And yet 
nowhere in the opinion did the Fourth Circuit say either that it disagreed 
with the Doninger test or that it was crafting a different test on the scope 
of authority issue. Also absent is any discussion of the facts or factors by 
which a sufficient nexus could be established in student speech cases 
generally or in the specific case itself.  Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had 
intended to adopt a “nexus” test for off-campus speech that differed from 
Doninger,  it failed to define that test.221 
In fact, rather than rejecting the reasoning of Doninger,  the Fourth 
Circuit discussed Doninger at length and actually applied the foreseeability 
test to the facts before it. 222 The opinion includes a lengthy paragraph in 
which the court described Doninger and quoted the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that discipline is appropriate when “it [i]s … foreseeable that 
the off-campus expression might … reach campus.”223 The Fourth Circuit 
also applied the reasonable foreseeability test to the facts before it,  finding 
that “it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s conduct would reach 
the school via computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices….” 224 
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the Fourth Circuit applied the Doninger 
foreseeability test rather than creating a new and different “nexus” test.  
The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari that 
had been filed in Kowalski.225 
In a case decided just one month after Kowalski,  the Eighth Circuit 
also relied upon the Second Circuit’s foreseeability test in holding that 
school officials had authority over a student’s off-campus expression that 
threatened a school shooting. In D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School 
District No. 60,226 the Eighth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Wisniewski to find that authority over a student’s off-campus 
speech exists when it is “reasonably foreseeable” that the student’s speech 
would “come to the attention of school authorities.” 227 One year later, the 
Eighth Circuit relied on both Doninger and Kowalski as support for its 
application of a foreseeability test, finding that school officials had 
authority to discipline students for racist speech posted on the Internet 
because the speech “could reasonably be expected to reach the school or 
impact the school environment.”228 
  
                                                                                                           
before extending Tinker to off-campus speech.”).  
220 J.S. v.  Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. ,  569 Pa.  638, 667-68 (2002).  
221 Toll,  supra,  note 219, at 3431.  
222 652 F.3d at 574.  
223 Id,  (quoting Doninger,  527 F.3d at 48, quoting Wisniewski,  494 F.3d at 40).  
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225 Kowalski v. Berkley Cty. Sch.,  132 S.Ct.1095 (2012).  
226 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir.  2011).  
227 Id.  at 765-766.  
228 S.J.W. ex. rel.  Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist. ,  696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.  
2012).  
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D.  The Ninth Circuit Declines To Adopt Any Of The Previously 
Articulated Tests.  
 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit became the fifth federal circuit to 
address the scope of authority issue in the context of students’ off-campus 
electronic speech. In Wynar v. Douglas County School District,229 the 
Ninth Circuit held that school officials had authority to discipline a student 
who, from his home, had sent “a string of increasingly violent and 
threatening instant messages … bragging about his weapons, threatening to 
shoot specific classmates, intimating that he would ‘take out’ other people 
at a school shooting on a specific date, and invoking the image of the 
Virginia Tech massacre.”230  
In addressing the scope of authority issue, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed all of the earlier decisions of its “sister circuits,” 231 including the 
decisions in Kowalski,  Lee’s Summit,  Wiesniewski,  Snyder and a 2004 
decision of the Fifth Circuit involving student off-campus speech that was 
not communicated electronically.232 The Ninth Circuit noted that, in 
Doninger,  Kowalski and Lee’s Summit,  the courts had devised “additional 
threshold test[s]”233 as prerequisite to the application of Tinker’s 
substantial disruption standard. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, each case had 
created different threshold tests.234 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Kowalski 
as establishing a “nexus” test235 and Lee’s Summit as establishing a test 
requiring that the speech be “’reasonably foreseeable [to] will reach the 
school community.’”236 Citing Wiesniewski (not Doninger), the Ninth 
Circuit asserted that the Second Circuit’s threshold test was not clear, but 
that it permitted school discipline where “it is reasonably foreseeable that 
speech meeting the Tinker test will wind up at school ….”237 Finally, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that the Third and Fifth Circuits had “left open the 
question whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech.”238 
In the end, the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt any of the positions 
of its sister circuits.  The court noted the difficulty of articulating “a global 
                                           
229 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.  2013).  
230 Id.  at 1064-65.   
231 Id.  at 1067.  
232 In Porter,  the Fifth Circuit case held that school officials had no authority to 
discipline a student who had drawn a picture depicting violence at school,  which came to 
the attention of school officials two years after its creation, when the student’s younger 
brother discovered the picture at home and took it to school.  393 F.3d at 620.  
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Circuit,  involved a threat of violence.   
238 Id.  at 1069.  
[] A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 25 
standard for a myriad of circumstances involving off-campus speech.”239 It 
also expressed “reluctan[ce] to … craft a one-size-fits-all approach.”240 
Rather, the court relied on the content of the student’s speech, stating that, 
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may 
take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech” that would 
cause a substantial disruption.241 The court then affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that school officials had not violated the student’s First 
Amendment rights, noting that “it is an understatement that the specter of 
a school shooting” could cause a substantial disruption at school. 242 
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit also analyzed the student’s speech 
under the “rights of others” prong that the Supreme Court had articulated 
in Tinker.243 The Ninth Circuit did note that this standard is little used by 
the federal circuit courts, but also held that it was quite an apt standard to 
apply to speech that threatened a school shooting.244 The court stated: 
“[w]hatever the scope of the “rights of other students to be secure and to 
be let alone,”  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 773,  without doubt the 
threat of a school shooting impinges on those rights.”245 
 
E.  The Fifth Circuit Creates A New Test On The Scope of Authority Issue.  
 
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the sixth circuit 
court to grapple with the scope of authority issue in the context of student 
off-campus electronic speech. The court’s en banc decision in Bell v.  
Itawamba County School Board,246 in which sixteen members of the Fifth 
Circuit authored eight different opinions, epitomizes the deep divisions 
among the circuit courts on this issue.   
The student’s speech in Bell was a rap song recorded outside of 
school and posted on the Facebook page of Taylor Bell, a student at 
Itawamba Agricultural High School who recorded the song under the 
name “T-Bizzle.”247 The rap song, which was riddled with vulgar and 
obscene language, accused two of the high school’s athletic coaches of 
sexually harassing female students.248 The two coaches were easily 
identified from the lyrics of the rap song.249 In addition to accusing the two 
coaches of sexual harassment, some lyrics referred to acts of violence 
against the coaches, as follows: 
 
                                           
239 728 F.3d at 1069.  
240 Id.  
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“rights of other students to be secure and let alone.”  Id.,  quoting Tinker,  393 U.S.  at 
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243 Id.  at 1071-72.  
244 Id.  at 1072.  
245 Id.  
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 “Run up on T-Bizzle/I’m gonna hit you with my rueger;” 250 
 “You fucking with the wrong one/going to get a pistol down 
your mouth;”251 and 
 “Middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga/middle fingers 
up/he get no mercy, nigga.”252 
The day after Mr. Bell posted the rap recording to his Facebook 
page, one of the coaches learned about the song from his wife, listened to 
the song while at school, and immediately informed the school’s 
principal.253 The school district’s superintendent also was informed.254 The 
next school day, the principal and superintendent, along with the school 
district’s outside counsel, questioned Mr. Bell about the recording, but 
took no action.255  
Due to inclement weather, school was closed for four consecutive 
school days.256 During that time, Mr. Bell created a new version of the 
recording and uploaded it to YouTube. When Mr. Bell returned to school 
following the four-day break, he was informed at midday that he was 
suspended pending a disciplinary hearing; however, he was permitted to 
remain at school for the remainder of the school day so that he could take 
the school bus home.257 
Approximately two weeks later, a disciplinary hearing was held. 258 
Mr. Bell appeared before the disciplinary committee and stated that he had 
created the rap song to bring awareness to the issue of alleged harassment 
by the coaches and that he had not intended to make any threats of 
violence against the school coaches, although he acknowledged that the 
words of the rap song could be construed as a threat. 259 Following the 
hearing, the disciplinary committee determined that it could not 
conclusively find that the Mr. Bell’s song constituted a threat to 
teachers,260 but that his speech had constituted harassment or intimidation 
of teachers in violation of school policy.261 The disciplinary committee 
recommended that the school board impose several sanctions, including 
placement in the county’s alternative school for the remainder of the 
grading period.262 
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manufactured by Sturm, Ruger & Co. Id.  at 385.  
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Mr. Bell appealed the committee’s decision to the school board, 
which reviewed the matter and determined that Mr. Bell had not only 
harassed or intimated school employees, but that he also had made threats 
against them.263 The school board thus accepted the disciplinary 
committee’s recommendation.264 
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Bell and his mother filed suit. 265 
Initially the Bells sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
implementation of the school board’s disciplinary sanctions;266 however, 
the federal district court denied the motion as moot because Mr. Bell’s 
placement at the alternative school had ended.267 Later, the federal district 
granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, finding that 
Mr. Bell’s rap song had “in fact caused a material and substantial 
disruption at school” and also that school officials had reasonably forecast 
that a substantial disruption could take place at school.268 
The Bells then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.269 In December 2014, 
a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, finding 
that the school board had violated Mr. Bell’s First Amendment rights by 
disciplining him for his off-campus speech. 270 The decision was a 2-1 
ruling, with Judge Rhesa Barksdale writing a vigorous dissent. 271 In 
February 2015, the Fifth Circuit granted the school board’s petition for a 
rehearing en banc and vacated the earlier opinion pending additional 
briefing and oral argument before the en banc panel.272 Oral argument was 
heard before the en banc panel on May 12, 2015. 273 
The en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in August 
2015.274 The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the school board, finding that the board had not violated Mr. 
Bell’s First Amendment rights. 275 However, the en banc panel of the Fifth 
Circuit was highly divided. Of the twelve judges in the majority, six 
judges either authored or joined in separately written concurring 
opinions.276 Four judges dissented from the decision, and each of the 
dissenting judges wrote a separate dissenting opinion.277 
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The majority opinion278 began by reviewing the Supreme Court’s 
four student speech cases, ultimately concluding that the constitutionality 
of discipline imposed on Mr. Bell properly should be analyzed under 
Tinker rather than any of the other school speech cases. 279  
On the scope of authority issue, the majority opinion in Bell 
asserted that five of six circuit courts to address the issue had determined 
that “under certain circumstances, Tinker applies to speech which 
originated, and was disseminated, off-campus.”280 In tallying up the circuit 
courts that had extended Tinker to off-campus speech, the majority in Bell 
included the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wynar notwithstanding the Ninth 
Circuit’s express reluctance to adopt any of the threshold tests of the other 
circuit and the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to fashion its own test under which 
students’ off-campus electronic speech generally would be subject to 
school authority.281 The majority also included its own circuit as one that 
favored extending Tinker to off-campus speech even though the Fifth 
Circuit had not yet addressed the issue.282 Additionally, two of the three 
prior Fifth Circuit cases on the issue had found in favor of the students on 
the ground that school authority did not extend to speech created off-
campus.283 The only pro-school Fifth Circuit decision cited by the majority 
was decided in 1973, decades before the Supreme Court decided Fraser,  
Kuhlmeier or Morse and, of course, before the widespread use of 
electronic communications.284   
Although counting all but the Third Circuit as having concluded 
that Tinker can apply to off-campus speech,285 the majority opinion did 
note that the circuit courts had taken “varied approaches”286 to the issue. 
The majority expressly declined either to “adopt or reject approaches 
advocated by other circuits”287 or to “adopt any rigid standard”288 with 
regard to the scope of authority issue; rather, it fashioned a test entirely 
limited to the facts before it.  The majority held that Tinker applies to a 
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student’s off-campus speech when (a) “a student intentionally directs 
[speech] at the school community;” and (b) the speech is “reasonably 
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a 
teacher.”289  
Those two circumstances only addressed the preliminary question 
whether school officials had the authority to examine the student’s speech 
under the Tinker substantial disruption standard.290 Thus, in order to 
answer the penultimate question whether the conduct of officials had 
violated Mr. Bell’s First Amendment rights, the majority considered 
whether his speech either had caused a substantial disruption or could have 
been reasonably forecast to cause a substantial disruption. 291 On that 
question, the majority concluded that school officials could have 
reasonably foreseen that Mr. Bell’s rap song would cause a future 
substantial disruption had he not been disciplined. 292 
As noted above, there were multiple concurring and dissenting 
opinions written in Bell.  Several judges who concurred in the decision 
wrote concurring opinions in an apparent effort to limit the scope of the 
majority decision.293 For example, Judge E. Grady Jolly wrote a separate 
concurring opinion in which he stated that he would have decided the case 
“in the simplest way … by saying as little as possible.”294 Judge Jolly 
would have adopted a more limited rule focused solely on threats of 
violence, as follows: 
 
Student speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and 
is subject to school discipline when that speech contains an 
actual threat to kill or physically harm personnel and/or 
students of the school; which actual threat is connected to 
the school environment; and which actual threat is 
communicated to the school, or its students, or its 
personnel.295 
 
Thus, Judge Jolly would not have addressed off-campus student speech 
that could be construed harassing or intimidating a teacher.  
 Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod wrote a concurring opinion that also 
focused only on threats of physical violence.296 She opined that the 
majority opinion did not make Tinker applicable to off-campus student 
speech of a non-threatening nature “even if some school administrators 
might consider such speech offensive, harassing or disruptive.”297 Indeed, 
Judge Walker quoted from Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in the Third 
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Circuit’s decision in Snyder,  where Judge Smith warned that “broad off-
campus application of Tinker ‘would create a precedent with ominous 
implications.’”298 Casting the majority opinion in Bell as one that avoided 
such ominous implications by “sensibly” limiting the scope of school 
authority to student speech that “contained threats of physical violence,” 
Judge Walker concurred in the result.299 
 Finally, Judge Gregg Costa wrote a concurring opinion,300 joined 
by two other members of the panel,  in which he emphasized the need for 
guidance from the Supreme Court on the scope of authority issue, stating: 
 
Broader questions raised by off-campus speech will be left 
for another day. That day is coming soon, however, and 
this court or the higher one will need to provide clear 
guidance for students, teachers, and school administrators 
that balances students’ First Amendment rights that Tinker 
rightly recognized with the vital need to foster a school 
environment conducive to learning. That task will not be 
easy in light of the pervasive use of social media among 
students and the disruptive effect on learning that such 
speech can have when it is directed at fellow students and 
educators.301 
 
 Four judges of the en banc panel dissented from the decision in 
Bell,  and each judge wrote a separate dissenting opinion. 302 Judge James 
L. Dennis, who had written the majority opinion in the original panel 
decision that was vacated pending en banc review,303 wrote a scathing 
dissent in which he accused the majority of committing “several serious 
and unfortunate constitutional errors.”304 In sharp words, he accused the 
majority of gutting students’ First Amendment rights: 
 
[T]he majority opinion obliterates the historically significant 
distinction between the household and the schoolyard by 
permitting a school policy to supplant parental authority 
over the propriety of a child’s expressive activities on the 
Internet outside of school, expanding schools’ censorial 
authority from the campus and the teacher’s classroom to 
the home and the child’s bedroom. 305 
 
In sharp contrast to the approach taken by the majority, Judge Dennis’s 
analysis of the issue began not with the question whether Mr. Bell’s 
                                           
298 Id.   
299 Id.  
300 Id.  (Costa,  J. ,  Owen, J. ,  Higginson,  J. ,  concurring).  
301 Id.  at 403.  
302 Id.  (Dennis,  J,  Graves, J. ,  Prado, J. ,  dissenting); Id.  at 433 (Prado, J. ,  
dissenting); Id.  at 435 (Haynes, J. ,  dissenting);  Id.  (Graves, J. ,  dissenting).  
303 774 F.3d 280.  
304 Id.  at 406.  
305 Id.  at 404.  
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speech was “student” speech or not but whether his speech was entitled to 
First Amendment protection generally.306 In other words, Judge Dennis 
first treated Mr. Bell a citizen, not a student.307 Characterizing Mr. Bell’s 
rap song as speech on an issue of public concern, specifically alleged 
sexual harassment of female students, Judge Dennis opined that Mr. Bell’s 
speech was speech that “’occupie[d] the highest rung of hierarchy of First 
Amendment values and [thus] … entitled to special protection.’”308 Citing 
Supreme Court precedent, 309 Judge Dennis opined that the vulgar and 
violent words used in the song did not alter the conclusion that the song 
addressed a matter of public concern, even if Mr. Bell’s words “f[e]ll 
short of the School Board’s aesthetic preferences for socio-political 
commentary ….”310 
 Judge Dennis next criticized the majority’s two-part test for 
determining whether Mr. Bell’s rap song was student speech subject to the 
disciplinary power of school authorities.  As to the first part of the test, the 
requirement that a student must have “intentionally directed” speech at the 
school community, Judge Dennis noted that such a requirement would 
eviscerate the First Amendment by punishing the speaker for attempting to 
communicate his or her message to others. 311 In other words, a student 
could avoid satisfying this requirement of “intentional direction” only if 
the student communicated so privately that his or her message would not 
be seen by many in school community.  
 As to the second part of the majority’s test – that the speech would 
be reasonably understood to constitute threatening, harassing or 
intimidating language toward a teacher, Judge Dennis decried the use of 
“content-based” and “vague” language as a means to determine First 
Amendment protection.312 He concluded that the “majority opinion’s 
failure to define ‘threatening,’ ‘harassing,’ or ‘intimidating’”  language 
made its articulated test constitutionally unworkable. 313 Judge Dennis also 
                                           
306 Id. at 406-12.  
307 Indeed, Judge Dennis criticized the majority for “simply assuming that all 
children speak “qua students,” Id.  at 425, and for otherwise assuming that “minors’ 
constitutional rights outside of school are somehow qualified if they coincidentally are 
enrolled in a public school.”  Id.  (emphasis in original).  
308 Id.  at 406, quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S.  138, 145 (1983)).  
309 Judge Dennis reviewed at length the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), in which the Court found that the First Amendment 
prohibited the imposition of tort liability against the Westboro Baptist Church, a fringe 
group that had picketed the funerals of American soldiers killed in the line of duty. Id.  at 
448. At such funerals,  picketers had displayed signs that read, among other things, 
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Thank God for IEDs, and “God Hates the USA/Thank 
God for 9/11.”  Id.  at 449. The Court held that such speech was protected under the First 
Amendment because the picketers had been commenting on matters of public concern. Id.  
at 451. Such speech is protected by the First Amendment even if it is “upsetting,” 
“arouses contempt,” or expressed an idea that society finds to be “offensive or 
disagreeable.” Id.  at 458.  
310 799 F.3d at 409.  
311 799 F.3d at 411.  
312 Id.  at 413-16. 
313 Id.  at 416.  
32 A MISSED OPPORTUNITY [] 
opined that this vague language would impermissibly define First 
Amendment protection according to the potential reactions of listeners.314 
He categorically rejected any test of free speech that would rely on the 
listener’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the speech as harassing or 
intimidating.315 Judge Dennis expressed concern that the constitutional 
infirmities of such vague language were further “exacerbated by the facts 
that the Tinker [substantial disruption] standard itself could be viewed as 
somewhat vague.”316 In Judge Dennis’s view, these “various layers of 
vagueness” would impermissibly restrict students’ First Amendment 
protections.317 
 Judge Dennis made no attempt to fashion an alternative test to 
govern the scope of authority over students’ off-campus speech. Rather, 
he simply criticized the majority’s decision to apply Tinker to the off-
campus speech at issue in the case, finding that the Tinker standard had 
been created only for the purpose of allowing school officials to 
“counteract the consequences of speech that actually occurs within the 
school environment.”318 He also criticized the extension of school 
authority to student off-campus speech as an unwarranted intrusion into 
parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children. 319 Finally, Judge 
Dennis concluded that, even if school officials had the authority to 
discipline Mr. Bell for his off-campus speech, they had violated his First 
Amendment rights because the facts did not demonstrate either an actual 
substantial disruption at school or a reasonable forecast of a substantial 
disruption.320 
 Judge Edward C. Prado also wrote a dissenting opinion in Bell.321 
The main thrust of Judge Prado’s opinion was the “hope that the Supreme 
Court will soon give courts the necessary guidance to resolve these 
difficult cases.”322 He noted that Mr. Bell’s speech did not fit into 
“currently established, narrow categories of unprotected speech” 323 
previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Judge Prado briefly 
reviewed some of the existing circuit court decisions addressing student 
off-campus electronic speech, before concluding that the majority opinion 
had “appear[ed] to depart from the other, already divided circuits in yet 
another direction.”324 Judge Prado then stated that he “would wait for the 
Supreme Court to act before exempting a new category of speech from 
                                           
314 Id.   
315 Id. at 421.  
316 Id.  at 418.  
317 Id.  at 419.  
318 Id.  at 425.  
319 Id.  at 426, quoting Morse,  551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J. ,  concurring) (“It is a 
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority – including their 
authority to determine what their children may say and hear – to public school 
authorities”).  
320 Id.  at 427-31. 
321 Id.  at 433-35. 
322 Id.  
323 Id.  at 434. He also stated that the issue of students’ off-campus electronic speech 
was a “poor fit” within current First Amendment jurisprudence.  Id.  at 433. 
324 Id.  at 433-34. 
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First Amendment protection.”325 He did express concern over the 
potentially harmful impact that students’ off-campus speech could have on 
the school community,  but concluded that “the difficult issues of off-
campus online speech will need to be addressed by the Supreme Court.”326 
 Judge Catharina Haynes wrote a brief dissenting opinion in which 
she stated that she would have reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and remanded the case for reasons stated in the 
majority opinion of the three-judge panel that had originally decided the 
case. 327  
Finally, Judge James E. Graves authored a dissenting opinion in 
which he proposed that a “modified Tinker standard”328 be used in cases 
involving student off-campus speech. Judge Graves’s test borrowed pieces 
and parts from the decisions of other circuits, principally the Doninger and 
Kowalski cases.329 The test proposed by Judge Graves would allow school 
officials to discipline a student for off-campus speech if the school could 
(a) satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard (either an actual or 
reasonably forecasted disruption) and (b) “demonstrate a sufficient nexus 
between the speech and the school’s pedagogical interests that would 
justify the school’s discipline of the student.”330 Three non-exclusive 
factors could demonstrate a sufficient nexus.  Those factors were: (a) 
“whether the speech could reasonably be expected to reach the school 
environment;”331 (b) “whether the school’s interest as trustee of student 
well-being”332 outweighs parents’ traditional role in disciplining their 
children for conduct outside of school;333 and (c) “whether the 
predominant message of the student’s speech is entitled to heightened 
protection.”334 
On November 17, 2015, Mr. Bell filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the Supreme Court. 335 On February 29, 2016, the Supreme 
Court denied the petition.336 
                                           
325 Id.  Judge Prado did note that the Fifth Circuit previously had held that student 
speech threatening violence on the scale of “mass, systematic school-shootings in the 
style that has become painfully familiar in the United States” is not protected by the First 
Amendment.  Id.  (emphasis added), quoting Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist. ,  508 
F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.  2007).  
326 Id.  at 435.  
327 Id. ,  citing Bell,  774 F.3d at 290-303. 
328 799 F.3d at 435.  
329 Id.  at 436 & n. 2-6.  
330 Id.  
331 Id.  & n.3,  citing Wisniewski,  494 F.3d at 38-39; Doninger,  527 F.3d at 50; 
D.J.M. ,  647 F.3d at 766.  
332 Id.  
333 As to this second factor,  Judge Graves proposed that a court should give 
particular weight to evidence, experiential or otherwise,  that indicated that certain forms 
of student off-campus speech had “a unique and proven adverse impact on students and 
the campus environment.”  Id.  He specifically referenced the research on bullying that 
had been cited by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski as an example of such evidence. Id.  & 
n.6.  
334 Id.  
335 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,  Bell v.  Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,  No. 15-
666, 2015 WL 7299351 (U.S.) (filed Nov. 17, 2015).  
336 Bell v.  Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,  136 S.Ct. 1166 (2016).  
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III.  EXISTING PRECEDENTS PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE.  
 
The splintered and disparate approaches taken by the federal circuit 
courts have resulted in scores of different opinions among scholars and 
educators about the proper framework to be applied to student off-campus 
electronic speech. Most commentators agree that students have the free 
speech rights of an ordinary citizen when not at school. Also a point of 
general agreement is that students have the right to a safe and secure 
learning environment uninterrupted by the speech of other students. How 
to accomplish those twin goals is a subject of much debate.  
Although the scope of students’ First Amendment rights regarding 
off-campus electronic speech is a thorny one, the Supreme Court’s 
existing precedents, when considered together, largely provide the 
appropriate framework to balance students’ constitutional rights against the 
authority of school officials to maintain an orderly and effective learning 
environment at school. In particular, the Tinker standards largely provide 
the appropriate framework to address students’ free speech rights in the 
digital age.337  
 
A.  The Court Should Create A New Category Of Unprotected Student 
Speech: Speech That Threatens Death or Serious Bodily Harm To A 
Member Of The School Community. 
 
Clearly the on-campus/off-campus distinction should not protect 
student speech that threatens serious physical harm to any member of the 
school community, whether the threat is akin to a Columbine-type 
shooting338 or a specific threat made against a particular individual.339 
Students and school employees alike should be protected from threats of 
death or serious bodily harm. Thus, the First Amendment should not 
protect any student’s off-campus electronic speech that a school official 
reasonably believes is a credible threat of death or serious bodily harm 
against either the school community in general or any member of the 
school community. 
 To date, the courts essentially have recognized and upheld this 
principle, although the legal reasoning they have employed to reach this 
conclusion has varied.340 For example, in Wisniewski,  the Second Circuit 
                                           
337 There are scholars who have advocated that Tinker be abandoned completely. See, 
e.g.,  R. George Wright,  Post-Tinker,  10 STAN.  J.  CIV.  RTS.  & CIV.  LIBERTIES 1 (2014). 
Others have advocated that a different standard be created specifically for students’ 
“technology-facilitated expression.” Kathleen Conn, The Third Circuit En Banc 
Decisions On Out-Of-School Student Speech: Analysis and Recommendations, 270 EDUC.  
L.  REP.  389, 406 (2011).  
338 Wynar,  728 F.3d 1062 
339 Wisniewski,  494 F.3d 34; J.S.,  569 Pa. at 667-68 (the student’s off-campus 
speech included a drawing of a teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping from her 
neck, accompanied by a list of reason why she should die).  
340 See Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School 
Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM.  & MARY BILL RTS.  J.  591, 599-
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applied a threshold test premised on some “reasonable foreseeability” that 
speech would reach school a student’s off-campus speech that threatened a 
teacher.341 In Wynar,  the Ninth Circuit employed no threshold test, but 
determined that a student’s off-campus threats of a school shooting were 
not protected under Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.342 In Bell,  the 
Fifth Circuit determined that Tinker would apply to student off-campus 
speech of a threatening nature if the student “intentionally directed”  the 
speech at the school community.343 
 Thus, while these cases may have reached the correct 
conclusion,344 the courts’ varying approaches do not provide clear 
guidance for school officials.   
The most suitable approach is to simply create an additional 
category of unprotected student speech. Since the Court decided Tinker in 
1969, it has not hesitated to create additional categories of unprotected 
student speech. In at least two cases, the Court approved content-based 
restrictions on student speech. In Fraser,  the Court ruled that lewd, 
indecent and offensive speech was not protected when uttered at school. 345 
In Morse,  the Court ruled that student speech that promotes illegal drug 
use is not protected.346 Importantly, in deciding Morse,  the Court took 
pains to clarify that, in Fraser, it had not applied Tinker but had created a 
separate category of unprotected student speech.347 Thus, the Court in 
Morse approved of content-based restrictions on student speech if 
necessary to maintain order at school.  
While these two content-based categories obviously were limited to 
the school environment, the rationale for creating these categories was 
broadly grounded in the “special dangers”348 that can exist at school and 
the “special characteristics of the school environment.”349 Obviously a 
credible threat of death or serious bodily harm to members of the school 
community is one of those special dangers. 350 Students at school are a 
“captive audience”351 since their attendance at school is mandatory.352 As 
our nation’s recent experience makes plain, students sometimes are captive 
victims of the deadly intentions of others.353 In light of that grim reality, 
                                                                                                           
603 & 620-23 (hereainfter “Gold Waldman”) (2011) (discussing the courts’ varied 
rationales for imposing discipline on student speech that threatens school employees, 
whether the speech originated on-campus or off-campus).   
341 Wisniewski,  494 F.3d at 39.  
342 Wynar,  728 F.3d at 1069-70. 
343 Bell,  799 F.3d at 396.  
344 It is not clear that the correct decision was reached in Bell.  See, infra at n.  ___.  
345 Fraser,  478 U.S.  at 685.  
346 Morse,  551 U.S. at 408.  
347 See Part I.D. supra.  
348 Morse,  551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J. ,  concurring).  
349 Tinker,  393 U.S. at 506.  
350 See.,  e.g.,  Gold Waldman, supra note 340, at 603 (detailing the psychological 
effects experienced by school employees who were the targets of students’ violent 
speech).  
351 Fraser,  478 U.S.  at 684.  
352 Morse,  551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J. ,  concurring) (“School attendance can expose 
students to threats to their physical safety that they would not otherwise face.”).   
353 142 School Shootings since Sandy Hook Massacre in Newtown, Conn, WASH.  
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school officials must be able to act whenever faced with a credible threat 
of serious bodily harm to any member of the school community.  
The clearest means to give school officials the necessary authority 
is to create a new category of unprotected student speech. Student violent 
speech should not simply be folded into Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard, as was done in Wynar.354 There are two advantages of de-linking 
the threats of violence from the substantial disruption standard. One is that 
it simply avoids the somewhat tortured linguistics of labelling a school 
shooting as “disruptive.” School shootings are horrific events,  not merely 
“disruptive.”355 Second, removing credible threats of violence from the 
definition of a “substantial disruption” also will allow the Court to 
separately describe the scope of a substantial disruption, thus giving 
valuable guidance to school officials as to that separate category of 
regulation over student speech.  
Thus, the Court should find that student speech that school officials 
reasonably believe is a credible threat of death or serious bodily harm to 
any member of the school community is not protected under the First 
Amendment.356 Such student speech is subject to discipline regardless 
where it was created or the means by which it was communicated to 
school officials. 
If the Court were to create such a category of unprotected student 
speech, the Court should also clarify the contours of such a rule.  In 
particular, the Court should find that the inquiry is not whether the student 
subjectively intended to threaten someone, but whether a reasonable 
school official could objectively interpret the language as a threat. 357  
On that issue, the Court must distinguish the student speech context 
                                                                                                           
POST (Oct.  1 2015) (available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/1/142-
school-shootings-sandy-hook-massacre-newtown-c/) (last visited Sept.  27, 2016). Other 
information about school-associated violent deaths can be found at 
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/savd.html (last 
visited Sept.  27, 2016).  
354 728 F.2d at 1069. 
355 Id.  at 1070 (“It is an understatement that the specter of a school shooting qualifies 
… under Tinker.”).  
356 This is a different rule than that proposed by July Jolly in his concurring opinion 
in Bell.  See Part II.E.,  supra.  Judge Jolly proposed a three-element rule that required (a) 
an actual threat to kill or physically harm personnel or students; (b) which is connected to 
the school environment; and (c) is communicated to the school or its personnel or 
students.  799 F.3d at 401. Judge Jolly’s rule contains limits that are not ideal.  So, for 
example, if a student’s threatening speech was communicated to someone who was not 
another student or school personnel,  the third element would not be satisfied.   
357 See J.S. , 569 Pa. at 655-56. In J.S. ,  the student’s off-campus speech included a 
picture of the teacher with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the student’s speech constituted a “true threat” that 
was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Id.  In so holding, the court applied an 
objective reasonable person standard. Id.  at 656, citing Interest of A.S.,  243 Wis. 2d 173 
(2001). However, some scholars take the position that school officials must determine the 
student’s subjective intent as part of a true threat analysis.  See, e.g.,  Mary Margaret 
Roark,  Elonis v.  United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our Ever-
Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication,  15 U.  PITT.  J.  
TECH.  L.  & POL’Y.  197, 217 (2015).  
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from its recent decision in United States v. Elonis358 and the federal cases 
that have reached differing conclusions regarding the intent requirement in 
the context of a “true threat” analysis.359 In Elonis,  the Court addressed 
the issue whether criminal penalties could be imposed on an individual 
who published threatening statements on the Internet without proof that the 
defendant subjectively intended to make a threat. 360 The defendant in 
Elonis,  an adult male, had written several posts on Facebook expressing a 
desire to harm others, including one post in which he stated: “I’m 
checking out and making a name for myself/Enough elementary schools in 
a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever 
imagined.”361 After being convicted of violating federal law that 
criminalized any communication transmitted in interstate commerce that 
contained “any threat to injure the person of another,”362 the defendant 
appealed his conviction on the ground that the government was required to 
prove that he subjectively intended his postings to be threats. 363 
The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that the 
trial court had erred in instructing the jury that it need consider only 
whether a reasonable person would regard the defendant’s postings as 
threats.364 The Court determined that the reasonable person standard 
should not be applied to a criminal statute, reasoning that the imposition of 
criminal sanctions requires some proof that the defendant was aware of his 
or wrong doing.365  
By deciding the case on the more narrow issue whether the 
particular criminal statute required proof of a subjective intent to threaten, 
the Court avoided the constitutional question of the intent requirement 
needed to establish that speech constituted a true threat.366 Justice Thomas 
authored a dissenting opinion in which he did consider the First 
Amendment question.367 To demonstrate the need for an objective 
reasonable person standard, Justice Thomas invoked the circumstance of a 
school shooting, stating: 
 
[T]here is nothing absurd about punishing an individual 
who, with knowledge of the words he uses and their 
ordinary meaning in context, makes a threat. For instance, 
a high-school student who sends a letter to his principal 
stating that he will massacre his classmates with a machine 
                                           
358 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015).  
359 See John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally 
Protected Expression,  39 HARV.  J.  LAW & PUB.  POL’Y.  631, 652-56 (2016) (discussing 
the “subjective-versus-objective question” that has divided the federal courts in analyzing 
true threats).  
360 Id.  at 2007.  
361 Id.  at 2006.  
362 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).  
363 135 S.Ct. at 2007.  
364 Id.  at 2012.  
365 Id.  
366 See Bell,  799 F.3d at 420-21 (Dennis,  J. ,  dissenting) (discussing Elonis).  
367 135 S.Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J. ,  dissenting).  
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gun, even if he intended the letter as a joke, cannot fairly 
be described as engaging in innocent conduct.368  
Indeed, threats to cause harm in the school environment do require a 
different analysis. Even if the Court correctly applied the subjective intent 
standard in Elonis,  a case involving a criminal statute, the school setting is 
entirely different.  First,  any discipline meted out by school officials does 
not criminalize behavior or impose criminal penalties. Thus, the use of a 
reasonable person standard in terms of school discipline results in far less 
consequences than it does in the criminal context. Second, one can well 
imagine that many students whose speech is being considered as 
threatening will claim that subjectively they intended only to make a 
joke.369 In some cases, establishing a student’s subjective intent could be 
difficult.   In light of the potential risks, the objective reasonable person 
standard should be applied.   
School officials have the enormous responsibility to ensure that all 
students at school are safe and “secure.” 370 In order to fulfill their 
responsibilities to all students who are compelled to attend school, the 
proper standard in the school context is whether school officials 
reasonably interpret the speech as a credible threat of death or serious 
bodily harm. 
The Court also could provide guidance as to what constitutes a 
credible threat to cause death or serious bodily harm. The student’s speech 
at issue in Wynar provides a good example of a credible threat.  There the 
student frequently posted messages on social media that, over a period of 
months, grew ever more violent. 371 He specifically threatened to conduct a 
school shooting on April 20, the anniversary of the Columbine shooting.372 
He described the type of gun and ammunition that he would use, noting 
that he would “probly only kill the people I hate?/who hate me/then a few 
random to get the record?”373 The student’s speech alarmed the other 
students with whom he had shared his posts to such an extent that they 
contacted a school employee.374 After viewing the student’s online 
postings, the police were called and the student was taken into custody. 375 
In contrast, a recent federal district court case provides an example 
of speech that would not be viewed as a credible threat. In Burge v. 
Colton School District,376 a middle school student who was disciplined for 
off-campus statements he had posted on social media filed suit alleging a 
violation of his First Amendment rights.  The student’s speech included 
statements that he wanted “start a petition to get [his teacher] fired,”377 
                                           
368 Id.  
369 See Wynar,  728 F.3d at 1066.  
370 Tinker,  393 U.S. at 508 (students have a right “to be secure and to be let 
alone.”).  
371 728 F.3d at 1065.  
372 Id.  
373 Id.  
374 Id.  at 1066.  
375 Id.  
376 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Ore. 2015).  
377 Id.  at 1060.  
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that she was “the worst teacher ever,” 378 and that she was “just a bitch.”379 
After a friend responded “XD HAHAHAHA!!,”380 the student wrote “Ya 
haha she just needs to be shot.”381 
Although the student deleted the post within twenty-four hours 
after posting it,  another student had printed out a copy of the post and, 
many weeks later, gave the printout to the school principal. 382 The 
principal then determined to suspend the student from school and 
thereafter the student filed suit.383 The federal district court granted the 
student’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the school district 
had violated the student’s First Amendment rights. 384  
The court determined that the student’s speech could not be 
construed as a true threat to school safety under either a subjective or an 
objective standard.385 In so holding, the court noted that, after reading the 
printout, school officials did not question the student or his parents about 
access to guns, contact law enforcement, or seek a mental health 
evaluation of the student. 386 School officials also did not remove the 
student from the teacher’s classroom. 387 Rather, the student simply was 
given a three-and-one-half day in-school suspension, which he served by 
sitting in an office at school.388 Thus, the court determined that the conduct 
of school officials showed a lack of any reasonable belief that the speech 
constituted a credible threat. 389  
Given the serious issue of student threats of violence, it truly is 
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Bell.  First, 
the Court could have articulated a clear category of unprotected student 
off-campus speech.  In addition, the Court could have outlined the 
contours of that category. Arguably the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding 
that Mr. Bell’s rap song was a threat. 390 The majority in Bell determined 
that school personnel had been threatened even though, under the 
measures outlined in Burge,  no credible threat of violence had been made.  
In Bell,  school officials did not contact law enforcement. 391 On the first 
                                           
378 Id.  
379 Id.  
380 Id.  “XD” is a laughing emoticon. See http://slangit.com/meaning/xd (last visited 
Sept.  28, 2016).  
381 Id.  
382 Id. at 1061.  
383 Id.  
384 Id.  at 1060. The district judge adopted the report and recommendation of a 
magistrate judge, who recommended that summary judgment be granted to the student on 
his First Amendment claim and that summary judgment be granted to the school district 
on a due process claim. Id.  
385 Id.  at 1068-71.  
386 Id. at 1069.  
387 Id.  
388 Id.  at 1064.  
389 Id. ; see also J.S. ,  569 Pa. at 656 (relevant factors in determining whether a 
statement is a credible threat include how the recipient or other listeners reacted to the 
threat,  whether the threat was conditional,  and whether the speaker had made similar 
statements in the past).  
390 799 F.3d at 429 (Dennis,  J.  dissenting).  
391 Id.  
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day that they discussed the rap song with Mr. Bell, the school principal 
drove him home.392 On the day that school officials suspended Mr. Bell, 
they allowed him to remain unattended in the school commons for the rest 
of day so that he could ride the bus home.393 In addition, the disciplinary 
committee determined that any threat contained in the rap song was 
“vague.”394 These important facts from the case indicate that school 
officials did not interpret the rap song to be a credible threat of violence.   
Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bell,  the Court could 
set constitutional guidelines for this important category of student speech. 
In this regard, the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in Bell was a missed 
opportunity to clarify students’ First Amendment rights in the digital age.  
 
B.  Tinker’s “Rights of Others” Prong Should Apply to Student-on-Student 
Off-Campus Speech That Constitutes Bullying or Harassment. 
 
The lower federal courts also need guidance as to the proper scope 
of authority over student off-campus speech that constitutes bullying or 
harassment. This is an issue that is of particular importance in the digital 
age, since bullying using electronic means, also known as cyberbullying, 
can be particularly vicious and harmful.395 As to this form of student off-
campus electronic speech, many scholars have advocated that the Supreme 
Court extend school authority under Tinker’s “rights of others” prong. 396 
Indeed, bullying or harassing speech seems to fit squarely within the rule 
expressed in Tinker that one student’s speech should not interfere with the 
“rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”397 Due to the 
serious adverse consequences associated with student-on-student bullying 
and harassment, no First Amendment protection should be afforded to 
such speech, and school officials ought to have the authority to discipline 
students for such speech regardless whether the speech was created outside 
                                           
392 Id.  
393 Id.   
394 Id.  at 385.  
395 Kowalski,  652 F.3d at 572 (detailing the harmful effects of student-on-student 
bullying). Due to a variety of factors,  particularly the distance between bully and victim 
that electronic communications provide, cyberbullying can be particularly vicious and 
harmful.  See Kevin Turbert,  Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to 
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS.  J.  651, 653-54 (2011) (detailing the harmful 
effects of cyberbullying, particularly on adolescents); Gold Waldman, supra note 340, at 
647-49 (detailing research on cyberspeech).  
396 See, e.g.,  Martha McCarthy,  Student Expression That Collides with the Rights of 
Others: Should The Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone? 240 EDUC.  L.  REP.  1,  10 
(2009) [Student Expression]; Martha McCarthy, Cyberbullying Law and First Amendment 
Rulings: Can They Be Reconciled? 83 MISS.  L.J.  804, 828 (2014) [Cyberbullying]; 
Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. ,  at 553; Jon G. Crawford, When 
Student Off-Campus Cyberspeech Permeates the Schoolhouse Gate: Are There Limits to 
Tinker’s Reach? 45 URB.  LAW.  235, 262 (2013) (“The Supreme Court should validate 
the use of the Tinker second prong analysis as an independent analytical tool to be used in 
student off-campus cyberspeech cases involving bullying and harassment.”); Stacie A. 
Stewart,  A Trade-Off That Becomes A Rip-Off: When Schools Can’t Regulate 
Cyberbullying,  2013 B.Y.U.  L.  REV.  1645, 1660 (2013).  
397 Id.  at 508.  
[] A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 41 
of the school environment. I therefore join other scholars who advocate 
that Tinker’s rights of others prong be applied to student-on-student 
bullying or harassing speech.  
Tinker obviously was decided in an age where students did not 
harass or bully each other electronically; however, Tinker’s rationale, 
namely that all students have to the right to be “let alone”398 at school, 
applies to off-campus bullying or harassing speech because the effects of 
such speech are felt by the victim at school and impact the victim’s 
educational rights. Thus, at the next opportunity, the Court should hold 
that, under Tinker’s rights of others prong, a student who engages in 
speech that bullies or harasses another student in violation of state anti-
bullying legislation has no First Amendment protection.399 Due to the 
impact on the victim within the school environment, school officials are 
authorized to impose discipline regardless where such speech is created.  
In this category of bullying or harassing speech, there is another 
issue that the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Bell brings to the forefront.  
It is the issue whether student off-campus speech that targets a school 
employee is entitled to First Amendment protection. In Bell,  the Fifth 
Circuit determined that school officials could discipline a student whose 
off-campus speech threatened, harassed and intimidated a teacher if the 
student intentionally directed the speech at the school community and 
school officials could reasonably forecast a substantial disruption.400 And 
yet the majority in Bell stated, albeit in dicta, that a student’s off-campus 
speech that threatens, harasses and intimidates a teacher arguably might 
always “portend[] a substantial disruption, making feasible a per se rule in 
that regard.”401 The majority in Bell thus suggested that off-campus 
student speech targeting a school official always is unprotected because the 
forecast of a substantial disruption is per se reasonable and thus assumed. 
Thus, Bell reinvigorates a debate that had been prompted in part by 
the Third Circuit’s decisions in Layshock and Snyder,  two cases in which 
the students had created fake Internet profiles that ridiculed school 
administrators.402 In Snyder,  six judges dissented from the ruling in favor 
of the student primarily on the ground that the decision “left schools 
defenseless to protect teachers and school officials”403 from malicious 
cyberattacks by students.  Indeed, many scholars advocate that student off-
campus speech that harasses a school employee should not be entitled to 
First Amendment protection.404 Still others argue that school authority 
                                           
398 Tinker,  393 U.S. at 508.  
399 An important issue, which is beyond the scope of this article,  is how to define 
“bullying” or “harassment.” Some scholars assert that anti-bullying statutes contain 
vague language that unconstitutionally restricts students’ First Amendment rights.  See, 
e.g.,  John O. Hayward, Anti-Cyberbullying Statutes: Threat to Student Free Speech,  59 
CLEV.  ST.  L.  REV.  85, 118 (2011).  
400 Id.  at 396.  
401 Id.  at 397.  
402 Layshock,  650 F.3d 205; Snyder,  650 F.3d 915.  
403 Snyder,  650 F.3d at 941.  
404 McCarthy, Cyberbullying, supra note 396, at 823 (suggesting that all student 
electronic expression could be deemed to be in-school speech in order to allow discipline 
for speech “directed towards school personnel and classmates”); Butler,  supra note 41, at 
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should not be extended to off-campus electronic speech that targets school 
employees.405 These scholars reason that, unlike students, the educational 
rights of school employees are not implicated by off-campus electronic 
speech that targets them. 406 In addition, school employees should be 
“equipped emotionally and intellectually” to handle disrespectful or 
harassing speech published by a student.407 In addition, school employees 
have the ability to impose discipline if such harassing speech is repeated at 
school.  They have the ability to pursue civil remedies against students 
whose off-campus speech is defamatory or libelous.  
While student-on-student bullying or harassment should not be 
protected speech for the reasons stated above, student off-campus speech 
that arguably bullies or harasses a school employee should not be subject 
to school discipline.408 Students have a First Amendment right to “express 
disrespect and disdain for their teachers,”409 including expressing their 
views in vulgar terms if they wish.410 Extending school authority to student 
off-campus speech that arguably bullies or harasses a school employee 
could impermissibly chill student speech. Students have the right to voice 
criticism of school policies, procedures and personnel.  There is a real 
danger that school officials might “engag[e] in illegitimate censorship of 
speech critical of their own actions rather than imposing discipline to 
protect legitimate institutional interests.”411  School officials could 
overreach and violate a student’s constitutionally protected right to express 
complaints about a teacher’s competence, classroom demeanor or other 
                                                                                                           
302 (“Speech described as bullying, harassing, libelous, or threatening, it is directed at 
other students or school personnel,  is not protected speech ….”); Stewart,  supra note 
396,  at 1658 (“The decisions in Layshock and J.S. are a rip-off to students and parents 
because the bullying of school staff affects the ability of a school to provide a quality 
education.”).  
405 Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. ,  at 552-53 (disparagement of 
school personnel may have low disruptive impact); Christine Metteer Lorillard, When 
Children’s Rights” Collide:” Free  Speech v.  The Right to Be Let Alone In The Context of 
Off-Campus Cyberbullying,  81 MISS.  L.J.  189, 259 n.487 (2011) (distinguishing between 
student-on-student harassment and student-on-school employee harassment); Barry P. 
McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech,  77 MO.  L.  REV.  727, 755 (2012)..  
406 Lorillard, supra note 405, at 259 n.287.  
407 Id. ,  quoting Harper v. Poway Unifed Sch. Dist. ,  445 F.3d 1166, 1183 (9th Cir. 
2006).  
408 Analytically it is not clear that Tinker’s rights of others prong does apply to 
harassing or bullying speech that targets a school employee. The Court did refer to 
speech that either “invad[es],” 393 U.S. at 513,  or “collid[es] with,” Id.,  the rights of 
others without specifically who the “others” might be.  However, in at least one portion 
of the opinion, the Court specifically referred only to the “rights of other students to be 
secure and to be let alone.”  Id.  at 508.  Thus, it is not clear the rights of others prong as 
expressed in Tinker applies to school employees.  See Philip T.K. Daniel,  Bullying and 
Cyberbullying In Schools: An Analysis of Student Free Expression, Zero Tolerance 
Policies, and State Anti-Harassment Legislation, 268 EDUC.  L.  REP.  619, 632 (2011).  
409 Bell,  799 F.3d at 425 (Dennis,  J. ,  dissenting).  
410 Klein,  635 F. Supp. at 1442 (holding that school could not discipline a student for 
“giving the finger” to a teacher he encountered in a restaurant parking lot,  stating: “The 
First Amendment protection of freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of the 
effort to force-feed good manners to the ruffians among us”).  
411 McDonald, supra note 405,  at 728.  
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qualities simply to assuage a co-worker’s hurt feelings.412  
The facts in Bell amply demonstrate this conundrum.  If the 
arguably threatening lyrics of Mr. Bell’s song are not considered, the 
remainder of the song clearly ridiculed the coaches’ behavior (“drool 
running down your mouth”),413 called them names (“pervert,” “crazy” 
and “lame”),414 and denigrated a spouse’s appearance (“his wife ain’t got 
no ti[tt]ies”),415 among other comments.  Yet Mr. Bell also made a 
significant and substantive complaint that the coaches were sexually 
harassing female students (“looking down girls shirts,” “fucking with the 
students,” “rubbing on the black girls ears in the gym”).416 Although the 
majority in Bell deemed these statements to be harassment and 
intimidation, one of the two coaches testified before the federal district 
court that he considered Mr. Bell’s speech to be “just a rap song” and that 
any issue about the song would “probably just die down” if he did not 
draw attention to it.417  
Was the song harassing and intimidating, as opposed to merely 
disrespectful? Does the issue turn on whether the targeted school employee 
is upset? What about the fact that the student sought to publicize 
inappropriate conduct by a school employee? Given all the potential that 
students’ constitutionally protected rights to question and criticize the 
conduct of school officials could be improperly curtailed, the Court should 
not endorse a per se rule that students may be disciplined for off-campus 
speech that harasses or bullies a school employee based solely on content 
of the speech. 418 
Declining to extend authority over student off-campus speech that 
harasses or bullies a school employee does not leave school administrators 
without recourse. If the off-campus speech enters the school environment 
in such a way that a student either engages in lewd or indecent speech or 
causes a substantial disruption, then school officials have clear authority to 
impose discipline.419 Indeed, school officials overwhelmingly prevail in 
cases that challenge the authority to discipline students for vulgar or 
disrespectful on-campus speech directed towards school employees.420 That 
                                           
412 There is also the additional question of how to define harassing or bullying speech 
in this context in such a way that students’ free speech rights are not chilled.   Only a 
handful of state anti-bullying statutes apply to school personnel.  Gold Waldman, supra 
note 340, at 635.  
413 799 F.3d at 384.  
414 Id.  
415 Id.  
416 Id.  
417 Id. at 429 (Dennis,  J. ,  dissenting).  
418 Extending authority to allow discipline for off-campus electronic speech that 
harasses or denigrates a teacher could encourage schools to engage in electronic 
surveillance of students’ electronic communications.  See, e.g.,  Emily F. Suski,  Beyond 
the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority 
Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE WESTERN RES.  L.  REV.  63 (2014).  
419 Fraser,  479 U.S. at 685; Tinker,  393 U.S. at 513. Student on-campus speech that 
upsets a “civil and respectful atmosphere towards teachers” constitutes a substantial 
disruption.  Requa v.  Kent,  492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2007).  
420 Gold Waldman, supra note 340, at 617 (noting that students generally lose cases 
in which they challenged disciplinary action taken with respect to hostile or disrespectful 
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disciplinary authority would extend to any student who, although not the 
original author of the speech, repeats the contents of the off-campus 
speech because the second student has engaged in speech within the school 
environment.  
In addition, any direct electronic communications between a 
student and a school employee should be deemed to be “in-school” 
speech. As Judge Smith correctly noted in his concurring opinion in 
Snyder,  a different analysis should apply where a student “send[s] a 
disruptive email to school faculty from his home computer.”421 Students 
increasingly communicate electronically with school employees as part of 
their coursework. Those direct student-to-school communications are not 
out-of-school communications simply because the student is not physically 
at school. Rather, the student is acting “qua student”422 and any speech in 
that context would be subject to discipline under the Supreme Court’s 
existing precedents.423 Specifically, electronic communications between a 
student and a school employee is speech that, per Morse,  is uttered in a 
“school-sanctioned and school-supervised” setting.424 If the speech is 
lewd, indecent or offensive, it is subject to discipline under Fraser.   If it 
creates a substantial disruption – e.g., the student’s speech is 
communicated to the entire class via email and causes a distraction – then 
it is subject to discipline under Tinker.  
Finally, school officials and the targeted employee have other tools 
at their disposal.  Although school may not be able to discipline the 
student purely on the basis of off-campus speech, school officials who 
become aware of such speech can inform the student that his or her speech 
has been seen by school officials and that the student will be subject to 
discipline if the speech impacts the school environment.425  School officials 
also can bring the student’s speech to the attention of the student’s parents. 
Finally, if the particular school employee finds the speech to be libelous or 
defamatory, the employee could avail himself or herself of civil 
remedies.426  
                                                                                                           
speech directed to school employees).  
421 650 F.3d at 940.  
422 Bell,  799 F.3d at 389.  
423 Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.  
424 Id. ; see also Susan Bendlin,  Far From the Classroom, the Cafeteria and the 
Playing Field: Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made In A 
Student’s Bedroom, 48 WILLAMETTE L.  REV.  195, 241 (2011) “The Supreme Court has 
already made it clear in Morse then when the activity was school-approved, attended by 
students,  and supervised by school administrators and teacher,  a student’s speech could 
be regulated there even though he was literally standing off campus and not inside the 
schoolhouse gate.”).   
425 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments,  71 MD.  L.  REV.  705, 
727 (2012). Indeed, school officials would have the opportunity to teach an important 
lesson about our democracy.  See Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable 
Moment and Undermining the Future of the First Amendment – TISNF!, 60 CASE 
WESTERN RES.  L.  REV.  153, 200 (2009).  
426 See Alexander Tuneski,  Online, Not Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 
89 VA.  L.  REV.  139, 142 (2009) (discussing potential civil remedies); Backus, supra note 
425 at 187 (noting that a school employee successfully sued a student and his parents for 
injuries resulting from the student’s off-campus expression).  
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C.  Tinker’s Substantial Disruption Standard Should Apply to A Student’s 
Off-Campus Speech Only When An Actual Disruption Has Occurred. 
 
To date, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Wynar,  all of the circuit courts that have imposed discipline for students’ 
off-campus electronic speech have imposed a threshold test must be 
satisfied before analyzing the speech under Tinker.  In the Second, Fourth 
and Eighth Circuits, the threshold test is a “reasonable foreseeability” 
test.427 The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Bell set forth an “intentional 
direction” threshold test that is similar to the one proposed by Judge Smith 
in his concurring opinion in Snyder.428 For the following reasons, none of 
these threshold tests should be adopted by the Court.   
Some scholars have expressed approval of the Second Circuit’s 
“reasonable foreseeability” test as appropriately balancing the First 
Amendment rights of students and the authority of school officials to 
maintain a proper school environment.429 These scholars believe that a 
“two-tiered”430 inquiry under which school officials must first determine 
the reasonable foreseeability that a student’s speech would reach school is 
a “more conservative approach”431 that provides greater protection to 
students’ First Amendment rights, essentially because there is a threshold 
inquiry before Tinker’s substantial disruption standard is applied.432   
However, Judge Smith noted in Snyder, such a standard easily can 
be “stretched too far”433 and thus “risk ensnaring any off-campus 
expression that happened to discuss school-related matters.”434 Most forms 
of digital speech, whether a public posting on the Internet435 or a private 
text message sent to just one other person, can be preserved and later 
shown to others.  Thus, it is hard to conceptualize any form of digital 
expression that could not somehow come to the attention of school 
officials. Indeed, it is surely true that the students in Layshock and Snyder 
                                                                                                           
School boards would not incur any liability in an action filed by an employee who 
was the target of a student’s off-campus speech if the Court were clear that such off-
campus speech is protected under the First Amendment.  Gold Waldman, supra note340, 
at 634.  
427 Although the Kowalski decision has been interpreted by some as creating a 
“nexus” test,  the Fourth Circuit did not state that it was adopting a “nexus” test,  nor did 
it outline the elements or factors that comprise such a test.  See Part II.C.,  supra.  
428 650 F.3d at 940.  
429 Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. ,  at 551-52, citing Paul Easton, 
Splitting the Difference: Layshock and J.S. Chart A Different Path on Student Speech 
Rights,  53 B.C.  L.  REV.  E-SUPP.  17 (2012).  
430 Id.  at 551.  
431 Id.  at 551-52. 
432 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068.  
433 Snyder,  650 F.3d at 940.  
434 Id.; see also Clay Calvert,  Punishing Public School Students for Bashing 
Principals,  Teachers & Classmates In Cyberspace, 7 FIRST.  AM.  L.  REV.  210, 251 
(2009) (“[A]n approach like that adopted by the Second Circuit that relies solely on 
whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the question in question will come to the 
attention of school authorities give schools sweeping off-campus jurisdictional power.”).  
435 A Facebook post,  for example.  
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did not foresee that the disparaging MySpace profiles they created would 
come to the attention of their school principals. If just one student shares 
what was intended to be a private communications, school officials will 
have become aware of the off-campus speech.436 Thus, the reasonable 
foreseeability standard seems to provide very little protection to 
students.437 
In addition, the type of student off-campus electronic speech that 
most likely would come to the attention of school authorities would be 
speech relating to school events or individuals. By providing such a low 
threshold for the imposition of school discipline, the reasonable 
foreseeability test unduly constricts students’ ability to engage in free 
speech about an important and predominant aspect of their lives: school. 438 
Students would have very limited First Amendment rights if, in speaking 
about school matters while not at school, they must restrict the audience to 
such an extent that it would be unreasonable for their speech would come 
to the attention of school authorities.   
The “intentional direction” language used by the Fifth Circuit in 
Bell might, at first glance, appear to set a higher threshold because it 
would require some the student had directed speech into the school 
environment.439 However, it suffers from essentially the same defects as 
the “reasonable foreseeability” test. Again, the threshold for imposition of 
authority is quite low if a student’s “intentional direction” is determined 
by the extent to which the student spoke on a matter of interest to the 
school community and intended that other students would consider the 
speech.440 As with the reasonable foreseeability test, it seems that students 
would essentially have no protection if they sought to speak about a matter 
in any way related to school and they wanted their speech to reach 
others.441  In addition, the intentional direction test has the added difficulty 
                                           
436 650 F.3d at 921 (a student who was in the principal’s office due to an “unrelated 
incident” told the principal about the parody profile).  
437 See Bendlin,  supra,  note 424, at 221-22 (“[U]nder the foreseeability test … it is 
hard to know in advance how or when an Internet message might be printed out or 
brought on to the campus (in some form) by someone other than the student-speaker.  The 
problem with vague standards is that neither school officials nor students know exactly 
what the rules are.”).   
438 Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus 
Punishment,  85 INDIANA L.J.  1113, 1128 (2010) (“The Second Circuit’s broad 
construction of the “reasonable foreseeability” test thus suggests that schools may possess 
jurisdiction over virtually all student Internet speech that relates to school issues and tries 
to galvanize student action”).  
439 See e.g.,  David A. Polsinelli,  Untangling the Web: A More Guided Approach To 
Student Speech on the Internet,  54 S.  TEXAS.  L.  REV.  779, 807-08 (2013); Lindsay J. 
Gower, Blue Mountain School District v.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court 
Provide Clarifications For Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet 
Speech?64 ALA.  L.  REV.  709, 730 (2013) (arguing in favor of a “purposeful direction” 
standard as superior to a foreseeability test).  
440 Bell,  799 F.3d at 386 & 394 (finding that Mr. Bell intentionally directed his rap 
song at the school community, presumably because of his apparent admissions that he 
wanted to bring awareness to the coaches’ conduct and he knew students would listen to 
the song.).  
441 Id.  at 418 (Dennis,  J. ,  dissenting) (deeming the majority’s intentional direction 
inquiry to be incurably ambiguous).  
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of asking school officials to determine the subjective “intent” of a student 
before imposing discipline.442 
The better rule is to not have any threshold tests. With the 
exception of speech constituting threats of violence or student-on-student 
bullying, as discussed above,443 school officials should authority to impose 
discipline only when the student’s off-campus speech actually causes a 
substantial disruption at school. In other words, student speech, no matter 
where it is created, that causes an actual substantial disruption within the 
school environment should be subject to discipline.444 If a student’s speech 
actually disrupts the school environment, the student should not be 
shielded from discipline by the excuse that the speech was created off 
campus. Given the prevalence of electronic communications and easy 
access to such communications even in the school environment, the off-
campus electronic nature of the communications should not be relevant to 
the inquiry.  The issue should be solely whether the student’s speech 
caused a substantial disruption in the school environment.  Thus, Tinker 
should apply even without the necessity of some threshold test.   
However, expressly applying Tinker to student off-campus 
electronic speech is not the end of the inquiry. If the Court applied Tinker 
to student off-campus speech, then the Court would need to define the 
word “substantial.”   In that regard, it is relevant that, even with evidence 
in Tinker that a mathematics class had been “practically ‘wrecked’ chiefly 
by disputes,”445 the Court found no substantial disruption. 446 A substantial 
disruption should be something much more than “general rumblings”447 
among students, “minor inconveniences” to school personnel, or limited 
distractions from classwork.448 Rather, a substantial disruption would 
require “boisterous conduct, interruption of classes, or [a] lack of order, 
discipline or decorum at the school.”449  
In addition to defining when a disruption is substantial, the Court 
also would have to address the issue of causation. In his concurring 
opinion in Snyder,  Judge Smith indirectly raised this issue by describing a 
scenario in which student, outside of school hours, posted a defense of gay 
                                           
442 Benjamin Ellison, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech With 
On-Campus Impact,  85 NOTRE DAME L.  REV.  809, 836 (2010) (“Subjective intent can be 
difficult to determine”).  
443 See Parts III.A. and III.B.,  supra.  
444 Bendlin, supra note 424, at 222.  
445 Tinker,  393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J. ,  dissenting).  
446 Id.  at 508 (“There is no indication that the work of the schools or any class was 
disrupted. Outside the classrooms, a few students made hostile remarks to the children 
wearing armbands, but there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.”).   
447 Snyder,  650 F.3d at 922.  
448 Snyder,  593 F.3d at 299.  
449 Bell,  774 F.3d at 296. School officials sometimes are wildly off-based in their 
own judgment that a substantial disruption has occurred as school See, e.g.,  T.V. ex. rel.  
B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp.,  807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (the 
court ruled that a school district had violated the First Amendment rights of two high 
school students who posted provocative photos of themselves over the summer vacation, 
finding that “two complaints from parents and some petty sniping among a group of 15 
and 16 year olds … can’t be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it enunciated the 
‘substantial disruption’ standard in Tinker.”).  
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marriage on a blog to which other students had a negative reaction. 450 He 
hypothesized that classmates who opposed gay marriage might, in reacting 
to the speech, cause a substantial disruption at school. 451  Judge Smith 
determined that, if Tinker were to apply to off-campus electronic speech, 
the student who posted the blog entry could be subject to discipline. 452   
In Judge Smith’s hypothetical, the student who posts the blog 
should not be subject to discipline simply because there is a failure of 
causation. Except in very limited circumstances, 453 speech that provokes a 
reaction in others who might show their disagreement by causing a 
disruption does not make the speaker responsible for the audience’s 
actions. In the hypothetical posed by Judge Smith, the student in favor of 
gay marriage would not have caused a disruption. Rather,  the students 
who would have voiced their opposition at school would be the cause of 
any substantial disruption. 
Such a rule might be difficult to follow sometimes.  Students might 
engage in off-campus, such as racist comments,  that could provoke strong 
reactions.454 However, in our democracy, even speech that many citizens 
would find “shabby, offensive, or even ugly” is entitled to First 
Amendment protection.455 When faced with such speech, students could 
learn a valuable civics lesson about fundamental values of our democracy 
and the ways in which others have responded to hateful or disturbing 
language or conduct.456 Such a result would be a valuable addition to our 
students’ education. 
 
D.  As to a Forecast of a Substantial Disruption, School Officials Should 
Not Be Able To Discipline Students For Their Off-Campus Speech. 
 
Finally, the Court also should determine that, as to off-campus 
speech, school officials may not impose discipline based on nothing more 
than a “reasonable forecast”457 of a future substantial disruption. Again, 
this rule would be applicable only if the Court also determined that student 
off-campus electronic speech is not protected when (a) the speech is a 
credible threat of violence against any member of the school 
community;458 or (b) it bullies or harasses another student. 459 With those 
two rules in place, student off-campus speech generally should not be 
                                           
450 650 F.3d at 939.  
451 Id.  
452 Id.  
453 While the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,  315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
established that “fighting words” are not protected under the First Amendment because 
their effect on listeners,  the Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 
(2011) greatly limit the applicability of that doctrine.  
454 Lee’s Summit,  696 F.3d 771.  
455 Bell,  799 F.3d at 426 (Dennis,  J. ,  dissenting). ,  quoting United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Grp.,  529 U.S.  803, 826 (2000).  
456 Backus, supra note 425, at 200.  
457 Tinker,  393 U.S. at 514.  
458 See Part III.A.,  supra. 
459 See Part III.B.,  supra.  
[] A MISSED OPPORTUNITY 49 
subject to discipline based on a potential future disruption.460  
School authority over off-campus speech should be limited to 
discipline for actual, not forecasted disruptions, because of the risk that 
school officials will overzealously predict disruptions.  In his dissent in 
Bell,  Judge Dennis aptly described the difficulty of forecasting future 
disruptions, stating: 
 
If this standard were applied off campus, how can a student 
or a student’s parents know with any degree of certainty 
when off-campus online speech can be “forecasted” to 
cause a “substantial disruption”? Although Tinker is not a 
completely toothless standard, … its framework inherently 
requires guesswork about how a third-party school official 
will prophesize over the effect of speech. 461 
 
Judge Dennis is right. Students’ constitutional right to speak freely 
when they are not at school should not be subject to second-guessing by a 
school official about the potential future impact on the school 
environment. Rather, other than violent or student-on-student bullying 
speech, school officials simply should not be able to impose discipline for 
off-campus speech without concrete evidence that the speech actually 
impacted the school environment.  Constitutional rights should not depend 
on the extent to which a particular school official undertakes a crystal ball 
inquiry about the potential future effect of a student’s off-campus 
speech.462 Indeed, the vagueness of the standard would allow school 
officials to conjure up reasons why student off-campus speech that they 
find distasteful, perhaps because they do not like the language463 or the 
images464 that appear in the student’s off-campus speech.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                           
460 Denying school officials the authority to discipline students for off-campus 
electronic speech on the basis of a potential future disruption is not the same 
constitutional analysis as allowing school officials the authority to prohibit students from 
wearing clothing that displays or represents a point of view (e.g.,  the Confederate flag) in 
order to avoid future disruptions.  See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unif.  Sch. Dist. ,  767 
F.3d 764 (9th Cir.  2014) (determining that school officials could prohibit students from 
wearing clothing bearing the symbol of the American flag on Cinco de Mayo).  
461 Bell,  799 F.3d at 418-19.  
462 For a review of cases that address the reasonableness of a forecast of future 
substantial disruption caused by students’ off-campus electronic speech, see Samantha M. 
Levin, School Districts as Weathermen: The School’s Ability to Reasonably Forecast 
Substantial Disruption to the School Environment from Students’ Online Speech, 38 
FORDHAM URB.  L.J.859 (2011).  
463 See Bell,  799 F.3d at 429 (Dennis,  J. ,  dissenting) (noting that,  in the preliminary-
injunction hearing, the school board’s lawyer characterized Mr. Bell’s rap song as 
“filthy”).  
464 T.V.,  807 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (school district could not reasonably foresee a 
future disruption arising from sexually suggestive photos that had been posted by two 
high school students over summer vacation).  
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Both the lower federal courts and school officials need Supreme 
Court guidance on all of the important First Amendment considerations 
that are implicated by students’ off-campus electronic speech.  By denying 
certiorari in Bell,  the Court missed an outstanding opportunity to provide 
that necessary guidance.  Given the facts in Bell,  the Court could have 
provided guidance regarding speech that arguably threatens violence in the 
school setting or arguably harasses or bullies others. The Court also could 
have clarified important aspects of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. 
While the decision not to grant certiorari in Bell represents a missed 
opportunity to clarify students’ First Amendment rights in the digital age, 
the lower federal courts and school officials alike can hope that, in the 
near future, the Court will provide the needed guidance.  
